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
1916

**MILITARY PREPAREDNESS**  
**Bibliography and Selected Arguments**

EDITED BY

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The benefits of education and of useful knowledge, generally diffused through a community, are essential to the preservation of a free government.

Sam Houston.

Cultivated mind is the guardian genius of democracy. . . . It is the only dictator that freemen acknowledge and the only security that freemen desire.

President Mirabeau B. Lamar.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY ON MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

The government publications listed below can usually be obtained by a student through the Congressman from his district. If more affirmative material is wanted than is given in this bulletin, write to the Navy League of the United States, Southern Building, Washington, D. C., for a list of pamphlets and prices. For additional material on the negative side, send to the American Association for International Conciliation, Sub-station 84, 407 W. 117th Street, New York City.

The Extension Loan Librarian at the University of Texas has a number of "package libraries" containing the best material obtainable on both sides of this question, which will be loaned in order of application. For this material write to Miss E. S. Goree, Extension Loan Librarian, University of Texas.

In the references given below, the abbreviation "Aff." signifies that the article in question is on the affirmative side of the subject, while the abbreviation "Neg." denotes a negative reference. Some of the references are not thus designated because they were inaccessible for classification at the time this bulletin was issued.

*QUESTION: Resolved, That for the next five years the United States should adopt a policy of increased military preparedness.*

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## BRIEFS OF BOTH SIDES

By Samuel G. Baggett and Carl B. Callaway

## AFFIRMATIVE

- I. The position of the United States as one of the world powers necessitates an increase in military preparedness, for
  - A. The probability of our being engaged in war is greater than in times past, for
    1. We are committed to definite policies which we are bound to maintain:
      - a. The Monroe Doctrine.
      - b. Open Door in China.
      - c. Status quo in the Pacific.
      - d. Neutrality of Panama.
    2. It is probable that we shall yet have to intervene in Mexico, for
      - a. The Mexicans have repeatedly invaded our territory and disregarded our rights of life and property.
      - b. A virtual state of war has already existed on our border.
      - c. "Intervention will prove the sole alternative to an indefinite state of anarchy." (Sidney Brooks, 19th Century 75:1194. June, 1914.)
  - B. We are no longer protected by isolation, for
    1. Our territory is now scattered from Alaska to the Panama Canal, and from the Caribbean Sea to the Philippines.
    2. Modern inventions have overcome distance.
- II. Our past experience warrants a change in our military policy, for
  - A. Although we have been finally successful in our foreign wars, we have suffered unnecessary cost in
    1. Time.
    2. Lives.
    3. Money.

- B. The conditions which guaranteed success in the past no longer exist, for
  - 1. Inexperienced men no longer make good soldiers, for
    - a. The crown of victory rests with the trained army, for
      - (1) The machinery of war is more complicated.
      - b. This is demonstrated by the European war.
  - 2. Our territorial isolation is a thing of the past.
- III. In case of war, the United States would be unprepared, for
  - A. Our standing army is inadequate, for
    - 1. It is smaller than that of Russia, Germany, France, England, Austria, Italy, Japan or Mexico.
    - 2. We lack an adequate mobile force, for
      - a. Too few men are left after provision is made for guarding our outlying possessions.
    - 3. Adding untrained men to fill vacancies would destroy the efficiency of our army.
    - 4. The militia cannot take the place of the standing army, for
      - a. Armies must be trained as units. "Trained armies can alone meet trained armies."—H. L. Stinson, *Harpers Weekly*, 56:12.
  - B. Our navy is inadequate, for
    - 1. It is insufficient to protect our coast, for
      - a. Our coast line is 21,000 miles long, greater than that of any other nation.
    - 2. Many of our ships are antiquated, for
      - a. The European war has revolutionized marine warfare.
    - 3. What ships we have are insufficiently manned, for
      - a. Admiral Blue stated that we were short 18,000 men for the ships we had in 1915.
  - C. Our coast defenses are not sufficient to defend our land, for
    - 1. They could not resist an attack from European warships, for

- a. Our guns have not the range of the guns on the modern warships.
  - 2. Our coast forts are inadequately manned, for
    - a. The Secretary of War said we needed from 8,000 to 10,000 more men to man the forts existing in 1915.
- IV. Greater military preparedness would be advantageous in times of peace, for
  - A. It would be advantageous for police purposes, for
    - 1. More men are needed on the border, for
      - a. Our territory has been invaded in spite of the border patrol.
      - b. President Wilson said during the recent Mexican trouble that he did not have enough men to properly protect the border.
    - 2. More police forces are needed in the Philippines.
    - 3. In times of a nation-wide strike or other internal disorder, our present force would be inadequate to handle the situation.
  - B. The army could better carry on such constructive work as
    - 1. Building of Panama Canal.
    - 2. Building roads into Alaska.
    - 3. Sanitation of the Canal Zone and testing of anti-typhoid vaccine.
- V. With greater military preparedness, we could be of more service among the nations of the world, for
  - A. We could better champion the cause of right, for
    - 1. Our voice would be stronger in the councils of nations, for
      - a. A nation's influence is generally measured by its military strength, for
        - (1) The most influential nations of today are those which have the strongest armaments.
    - 2. Right can only triumph over wrong when those who back right are stronger than those who uphold the wrong.

3. Our diplomacy would be strengthened, for
  - (1) "The stronger the arm, the firmer the hand that writes our diplomacy."
- B. We could aid more in bringing about international peace, for
  1. A strong nation could better propose disarmament than a weak nation, for
    - a. "The concessions of the weak are the concessions of fear.

NEGATIVE

- I. The United States should not now depart from her established military policy, for
  - A. A limited armament has proved adequate in the past, for
    1. We have always maintained the smallest armament consistent with safety, yet
    2. We have been successful in all our foreign wars with a total loss of only 15,000 men, and
    3. We have been the aggressors in all of our wars.
  - B. There is no increased danger warranting a sudden departure from this past policy, for
    1. There is no added danger from Europe, for
      - a. The European nations cannot attack us for years to come, for
        - (1) The war has drained them of men and money.
    2. There is nothing to fear from Asia, for
      - a. Japan, the only strong power capable of waging war with us, has repeatedly professed her co-operation with U. S.
      - b. Our armament is far superior to that of Japan.
    3. Mexico does not present any new danger, for
      - a. We are adequately prepared to handle Mexico, for
        - (1) We completely defeated Mexico in 1848, and

- (2) We are better prepared than ever before, while Mexico is in the worst condition of her history.

II. Our military preparedness is sufficient to guarantee our safety, for

- A. Our navy is adequate, for
  1. It is second in size and efficiency only to that of Great Britain.
  2. Naval experts agree that it is sufficient to resist the attack of any nation in the world, for
    - a. Foreign navies would have to operate away from base.
- B. Our coast defenses are adequate, for
  1. General Weaver, Chief of Coast Defense, says they are the best in the world.
  2. Aided by the navy and our mines, they could prevent the landing of any nation, for
    - a. The inability of a navy to cope with coast defenses has been demonstrated by the European war.
- C. Our third line of defense is ample, for
  1. We have nearly four million trained American soldiers,
    - a. Over 127,000 in the regular army; 175,000 provided for by Act of Congress in 1916.
    - b. 350,000 who have passed through the army in the last seventeen years.
    - c. 150,000 in the militia, to be raised to 550,000 by 1918.
    - d. 33,000 in our military schools together with 40,000 who have graduated since 1905.
    - e. 3,000,000 able-bodied Americans who have had military instruction in the U. S. or abroad.
  2. A large standing army is unnecessary in America, for
    - a. Our navy and coast defenses eliminate the necessity for a large army.
    - b. The success of the British troops in the

European war shows that a small army reinforced by recruits can successfully meet trained armies.

D. Our geographical position renders us safe from attack.

III. An increase in our armaments would add nothing to our relative strength, for

A. It would simply raise the level of armaments, for

1. Other nations would make a corresponding increase to offset ours, for

a. England will keep up her two-to-one naval policy at all odds.

(1) Lord Salisbury of England said publicly that if we increase our navy, England will make a corresponding increase.

2. Germany, Japan, and other nations will maintain their military policies.

IV. Extreme preparedness encourages war, for

A. If we have large armies and navies, we will be more apt to use them on slight provocation, for

1. "Every organ demands the exercise of its functions."

B. It causes a spirit of militarism, which in turn encourages war.

C. The nations of Europe were the best prepared nations in the world.

D. Prepare for peace and we get peace; prepare for war and we get war.

V. Our chance to lead the world in bringing about international disarmament would be lost, for

A. It would mean that we would enter the armament race with other nations.

B. Not national competition, but international union for defense against future wars, is the mandate of both reason and experience.

C. "He who comes into equity, must come with clean hands."

## SELECTED ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF INCREASED MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

LESSONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY

Edward Breck, M. A., Ph. D.

A great man has said, "The more history you know the wiser you are!" According to this standard the American people fall considerably short of wisdom, for the study of history has never been considered by Americans in any other light than as a means of indulgence in smug self-glorification. To this end the historic muse has been all but bereft of her garment of truth, and the American people, broadly speaking, is to this day, shamefully ignorant of the actual facts of its development.

*A burnt child fears the fire, but too often a burnt nation forgets almost over night that there has been a fire.* The possibilities of future national conflagrations were never more explicitly pointed out than by Washington himself in the very earliest days of our history, and his wonderfully far-seeing advice on the subject of defense is as pertinent today as it was then. But, in spite of it, the army and navy were so neglected after his retirement that, from 1808 to 1812, the former consisted of less than 10,000 officers and men, while the navy was as good as a non-existent, until the depredations of the Mediterranean pirates resulted in the building of a few fine frigates. These, with their splendid personnel, were all that we possessed, when there came to us in 1812 one of those crises foretold by Washington, when the choice between disgrace and honor left us no decision but for war, "a war," as President Wilson has rightly called it, "of arms brought on by a program of peace." Stung to action at last by the outrageous impressment of our seamen, we declared hostilities against Great Britain, with a standing army of 6,744 officers and men, and a navy of seventeen vessels, mostly of little military value, carrying 450 guns. This force was to oppose the veteran armies of England and the greatest fleet the world had ever seen, consisting of a thousand vessels and 28,000 guns!



Had we possessed a reasonably powerful navy, including a squadron of ships-of-the-line, plus a really efficient army, there would, in all probability, have been no war, for the simple reason that England would not have dared to take the risks of a war with America merely for the sake of her orders in council and the blustering proof that an Englishman once was an Englishman forever. What such a fleet and army would have cost us would have been but a paltry sum compared with the actual costs of the war, direct and indirect. Furthermore, had we been properly prepared, heedful of the advice of Washington, and had England nevertheless dared the conflict, there is no military authority who does not know that she would have been soundly thrashed. Her great line of battle ships would not have been able with immunity to convey troops across the seas, and Canada would now be a part of the United States.

But if you will take the trouble to inspect the American school and college histories used even at this day, you are very likely to get from them the impression that we actually thrashed Great Britain! In them you will find nothing of the bill passed by Congress to raise thirteen new regiments for the avowed purpose of "conquering Canada," a purpose which we so lamely essayed to put in practice that at the end of the war we were in possession of no part of Canada; in fact were glad enough to have prevented the British and Canadian troops from invading our own soil!

In these so-called histories you will find nothing of the solemn fact that up till the signing of the treaty of peace, the only decisive victory for the American arms on land was at the Thames, where the British were largely outnumbered. Our defeats are mentioned with indulgence, and many of them metamorphosed into victories; the disgrace of Detroit, where 1,800 Americans, mostly, to be sure, militia, surrendered without a blow to 720 British and 600 Indians, being about the only frankly confessed disaster. These books gloss over the affair at Bladensburg, where fewer than 1,500 British put to almost instant flight over 5,000 Americans, after which they gaily marched to Washington, burned down our capitol, and committed other villanies with contemptuous immunity, whereupon our Secretary of War fled to Baltimore and resigned!

At Plattsburg two columns of Americans, some 13,000 in all, recoiled before 2,000 British.

Do these books tell their readers that we outnumbered the enemy more than ten to one? I have never found this truth stated in one of them. One recoils before the speculation upon the outcome of the War of 1812, had England not had her hands full with the terrible fight against the Corsican usurper.

The war between the States offers a large number of vitally important lessons to the present generation. The first is the decisive influence of sea power, and in this connection we must not forget that, in a somewhat less degree, we are in the same position as Great Britain, since any serious attack must come from across the water. This means that we stand and fall with our navy, even supposing that there were no such thing as the Monroe Doctrine, the upholding of which our President has called "a solemn pledge." Do Americans fully appreciate that this means that, in case South America should be attacked by one or more European or Asiatic nations, the American navy would have to fight hostile fleets, not only off our own coasts, but very possibly off the shores of the Argentine or Chile?

The Monroe Doctrine was not seriously challenged until the Civil War found us with our hands full. But, before taking up the Mexican question of the early sixties, let us remind ourselves that it was naval power that finally brought the heroic South to her knees. It would be a bold historian who would assert that the South would have been beaten in four years, or in ten, or perhaps in any time, if she could have kept her ports open for the exportation of cotton and the unlimited influx of supplies and munitions of war. It was not until our navy became strong enough to blockade the ports of the South that economic and military starvation caused her political fall.

Then it was that Uncle Sam first found himself in a position to turn his gaze southwards to Mexico, where Napoleon was attempting, in fullest contempt of the Monroe Doctrine, to establish an empire under French influence with the unfortunate and duped Maximilian at its head.

Let us recall the situation exactly, in view of the oft-repeated assertion by the advocates of disarmament, to the effect that after the present great war the belligerents will find themselves in such

a state of exhaustion that danger from them will be unthinkable. How was it in 1865? The United States had just finished a terrible struggle of four years against the bravest and toughest of foes, and, according to the tenets of the Pacifists, she must have been so weakened as to be incapable of asserting herself against aggression. Was this the truth, in spite of the fact that aggression threatened from the two most powerful nations of the world? Let us see.

Hardly had the war closed when Secretary Seward called upon the French government to withdraw its troops from Mexico, upon the frontiers of which our army was concentrated. In those days the French military prestige was what that of Prussia is today, and Louis Napoleon was the essence of pride and ambition. But did he hesitate to obey the mandate of the American government? Not a day! The Tricolor bowed before the Stars and Stripes, and Napoleon's army slunk off in the dark, leaving the miserable Maximilian to his fate.

The next step taken by our government was to demand of Great Britain the payment of damages for the depredations against our merchant marine by the Confederate privateers, which were fitted out and launched in England with the connivance of the British Government, to which it was made plain that war would be the result of a refusal to arbitrate. The world knows the result. A Government bitterly hostile to the Government of our country, and possessing the greatest navy in the world, recoiled before the idea of a war with the United States.

And why in 1865 did the Union Jack and the Tricolor bow to the Stars and Stripes? Because, far from being weakened in a military sense by the four years of terrible war, she was at that time incomparably more mighty than she ever had been before!

Without taking time to follow out this significant and instructive train of thought, it is sufficient to say that, after the present war, several nations will possess veteran armies such as the world never saw before, and some of them will have navies that will possibly be nearly intact. Their financial weakness will not interfere with a renewal of hostilities, and perhaps may have the effect of a desire to recoup at the expense of some very rich and very weak country, somewhere over seas!

Though there were plentiful signs that the chronic Cuban ques-

tion would soon develop into war, nevertheless Congress did little to increase or strengthen either navy or army in the years immediately preceding 1898, no doubt reflecting the general optimism and carelessness of the whole country in regard to foreign complications.

On March 9th, the Congress voted \$50,000,000 for "national defense," but nothing for offense, and not a cent was available even for offensive preparations. Many mines were laid, but our coast was practically defenseless to a first-class naval enemy.

All our artillery pieces, field and heavy, were constructed for and actually used black powder, and while poor little Spain armed her troops with the best rifle in the world and gave them smokeless powder, our great rich country had just enough smokeless powder to supply our regulars and one regiment of volunteers, the Rough Riders. All other volunteers, among them the flower of our youth, were sent to the front and some of them actually into battle, with an obsolete gun and black powder!

At the battle of Caney the Second Massachusetts, as good a volunteer body as we have ever had, had to be withdrawn from the firing line after serious losses, because their old Springfields could inflict little or no damage to the enemy, while the smoke of their black powder served but to give the enemy the range.

In the same manner the fire of our field guns served the enemy the same purpose.

After two months of feverish preparation, this rich and proud country succeeded in getting together 17,000 men of the Fifth Army Corps at Tampa, and the confusion and inefficiency that followed in the effort to embark could be justly compared only with the *mise-en-scène* of an opera bouffe. It is significant of the state of mind of our people at that time, that, when one of our newspaper correspondents at Tampa, Mr. Poultney Bigelow, dared to tell the truth in his dispatches, his words were greeted with incredulity, with jeers, and in some quarters with the cry of "Traitor!"

Since then every historian, including Colonel Roosevelt, has testified to the humiliating truth of these charges.

At last the regiments, and really fine ones they were, so far as the personnel went, got afloat in transports hired for the purpose and for the most part quite independent of naval or military authority. By the most exceptional luck, and with the aid of

the navy, the men were landed near Santiago, though they had no proper means of landing, and could not have done so if the weather had not been perfect, or if the Spanish army had made a determined effort to prevent the landing. If such a man as Weyler had commanded at Santiago the expedition of the Fifth Corps might have suffered disaster right there.

Few, very few indeed, of our countrymen appreciate even to-day the narrowness of the cleft that separated our soldiers in 1898 from the disaster, nay, from probable annihilation. The supine lack of all initiative of the Spanish commanders, something that could never be repeated, was all that saved us. "Had there been on the Spanish side any generalship worthy the name, it is doubtful whether there would have been anything left of Shafter's army," is the way in which Sargent puts it. The Spaniards had plenty of time to concentrate a force of twenty or even twenty-five thousand men at Santiago, which could have taken up an unflankable position, forcing Shafter to a continuous offensive against odds, and the fever would have done the rest. As it was, it is most probable that, if the Spaniard had placed on the heights of Santiago the men who were idly and unnecessary defending quite unattacked positions to the west of the city, these would have been enough to keep back the Americans for a week, until the dread fever touched them, and then? One shudders to think of the inevitable sequel. It would have been a special Providence if a man of the Fifth Corps ever looked again on the soil of his country! And even as it was, with Providence called upon as never before to make good our shortsightedness and inefficiency of Washington, the Surgeon-General reported that there was not an American soldier who returned from Cuba without the germs of disease in him.

In this miserable business, when the richest country in the world sent its sons to slaughter in a manner that should arouse indignation to the pitch of frenzy, we lost some 350 men from bullets and over 1,350 by disease.

These are some of the lessons of our history, and in the contemplation of the practical efforts for real and immediate preparedness, which the gradual awakening of the American people are now making imperative, it is well to keep the past constantly in mind.

Have we learned our lessons?

## HOW BIG AN ARMY DO WE NEED?

## THE MILITARY PROBLEM OF THE UNITED STATES

By George Marvin

By being unprepared for war the United States has not in the past avoided war. Whatever, therefore, may be the difference of opinion concerning the way we shall deal with our military problem, that problem exists.

The military problem of the United States may be conveniently considered within the confines of the Nation itself. Here it has lawfully been used to suppress insurrection, to enforce the law when ordinary methods failed, to overcome obstructions of the United States mail, to enforce neutrality, to compel obedience to quarantine regulations, to run a telegraph line across Alaska (and soon to build the first government railroad in that region), to build the Panama Canal, to supervise the construction and repair of river and harbor works, to take charge of the situation when San Francisco was destroyed and when the Ohio River overflowed its banks, to restore order in great strikes in the mining regions, and to perform hundreds of other tasks that seem to be rather civil than military. As our population has grown and our territory extended it has been necessary to detail more men from the army for activities not directly military until now, though the greatest efforts are made to do so, it is impossible to keep the requisite number of officers with their troops. Leaving out of consideration the possibility of our having to intervene in any neighboring republic, much less of engaging in a war with a first-class power, the army is inadequate to perform even its peaceful tasks.

The second phase of our military problem is the potential necessity of having countries close to our borders. Intervention has more than once been acknowledged a necessity. We have "intervened" in Cuba, in Santo Domingo, in Haiti, in Nicaragua, in Colombia, and in Mexico. We may conceivably have to intervene in any one or all of these countries again. The

size of the forces which would have to be sent depends upon the strength of the detachments it would be necessary to oppose. The smallest of these possible hostile forces will seldom require less than from 8,000 to 10,000 regular troops. To intervene in Mexico would require upward of 100,000 regular troops in an expeditionary force.

There is no such number of regular United States troops available. To support them and to take their places would require a much greater number of volunteer or improvised troops, which, also, are not available. Just to assemble such troops as the latter takes a very long time; it requires more time to supply them with proper military material, and still longer time to train them to be of any use in active campaigning. Meanwhile, the prospective opponent is perfecting his defense. Consequently, the time taken to organize and put into the field these improvised troops costs more in lives and treasure than to have maintained a trained force.

Suppose, again, that an insurrection broke out in the Philippines: By sending all the mobile Regular Army left in the United States to augment that portion of it already in the islands, the rising could undoubtedly be put down, provided that the rebels received no outside assistance. If, also, while this army was absent, Mexico should attempt to invade Texas and New Mexico, the present number of organized militia could very probably beat back the attack. The Mexicans, however, would certainly cross the border and come a long distance this side of it before they could be stopped. In that interval they might cause great damage. To take the offensive promptly and go deep into Mexico with this force of militia, military men consider absolutely out of the question. A long time would elapse before such improvised troops could be brought to a state of efficiency justifying such an expedition.

#### NO ARMY TO MOBILIZE AGAINST INVASION.

Neither the necessity for the use of the army in a strictly internal way nor its use for comparatively small expeditions to foreign states is apt to threaten seriously the national entity or independence of the United States. But suppose we should be con-

fronted by a hostile power of the first class? The first question that would arise would be the question of mobilization, and here we bring up against the disturbing truth that the United States has no scheme of mobilization in fact. We have got some plans on paper. The Regular Army of the United States cannot mobilize the equivalent of one European army corps under existing conditions, for it is not organized on the basis of war duty; it is organized as a constabulary.

The organized militia cannot mobilize any unit of trained men complete above the infantry brigade. Even such an infantry brigade cannot be termed "trained." The militia is composed of military establishments in the various States over which the Federal Government has a very limited jurisdiction. The individual States can have any sort or kind of troops they wish, or none at all. One State has none at all. The aggregate paper strength of the mobile part of the organized militia amounts to about 106,000 men, but of this number almost one-third failed during the last year to participate in the annual instruction camps, and only little more than one-half of the men armed with rifles had range practice with rifles.

Under such conditions there can be no mobilization of United States forces, strictly speaking, for the very good reason that there is no war unit to mobilize. If the need should suddenly arise for an army we should have to improvise an army as we have improvised other armies in the past. To do this and to render the individuals composing such an army really efficient collectively so that they could march and fight as divisions or army corps would require more than two years on the basis of a mobile army of 500,000 men fit for duty on the line of battle.

All continental European countries can mobilize their active and reserve armies in about one week, with the exception of Russia, which requires about three times this period. After mobilization is complete, about one-third of the active and reserve armies can be concentrated on the frontiers within one week. Roughly, 14 days after the declaration of war the great field armies are able to engage in the campaign, both mobilization and concentration having been carried on under the protection of troops always kept at or near war strength along the frontiers, which promptly on the outbreak of hostilities engage the corres-



ponding troops with which the enemy is guarding a hostile frontier.

In the face of these facts we have continued to trust the sea that surrounds us to defend us from attack. But the sea is no longer a complete bulwark against invasion. Sea distance is not now measured in miles but in days. The Pacific Ocean today is no wider than was the Atlantic a few decades ago. The Atlantic itself has shrunk to the size of a Great Lake. Hence, if a world power at war with the United States could gain command of the sea their line of communications for an attack on either the Atlantic or Pacific coast would be no longer, in time, than was General Grant's in the Civil War when he was conducting his operations against General Lee's army in Virginia. Furthermore, larger amounts of materials and supplies could be transported in one of the great steamers of today than could be carried by all of General Grant's transportation—water, rail and wagon. On this basis, then, of time intervals we now find our once long distance friends our close neighbors. These neighbors are polite but firm and their military resources can be converted into military strength in an incredibly short time.

#### MILITARY RESOURCES AND STRENGTH.

The average citizen of the United States has always been prone to confound military resources with military strength. One is entirely distinct from the other. Military resources consist of all the men of military age and all raw material, such as horses, motors, materials for clothing, leather for shoes, meat and corn for food, coal, iron, lead copper—in fact, all the products necessary for the creation and supply of an army. Military strength is the proper utilization of these resources so that they can be converted into efficient army units, sufficient in number for use at the necessary places at the critical time. To convert military resources into military strength in the present day requires a longer time than it ever has before in the world's history. It is generally accepted as a fact that any nation, no matter how strong in military resources it may be, if attacked by a nation even very much weaker in military resources, which has already converted these resources into

military strength, will have absolutely no chance to defend itself at first and a very slight chance for eventual victory in that war. This conclusion simply for the reason that the nation strong in military strength can immediately place the proper number and kind of military forces at the critical point at the proper time.

#### MAIN DEFENSE THE FIELD ARMY

The Nation's main dependence in war, then, is its field or mobile army, which is that part of a nation's military establishment which can move from place to place, meet the enemy wherever he may be found, either at home or abroad, and which can fight either offensively or defensively, as occasion requires. *The great military problem that confronts the United States is to determine what its mobile army shall consist of, where it shall be stationed, how it shall be supplied, armed and manned with properly trained men, and how it shall be administered.*

What should the size of this army be? This is determined by the size of the armies that may be brought against us. It must be ready in time to stop a hostile invasion. Otherwise, the enemy, by seizing the great centers of population, railroads, and supplies, might paralyze the defense and render it impossible to create improvised troops. Strange as it may seem to those who have not given the matter consideration, this is perfectly possible of accomplishment by several nations. The nations mentioned below have a sufficient merchant marine to transport in one trip the numbers given across the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans. The manner in which these figures are arrived at is to take the total amount of sea-going tonnage possessed by the nation in question, figure on one-third of this being in home ports, one-third at sea, and one-third in foreign ports, which is the usual way of determining the distribution of shipping at any one time. Should preparations be made for a move to the United States, as they certainly would be in case of war, probably one-third more tonnage could be recalled by wireless in one week, the period necessary for the mobilization of the foreign armies. Should more time than one week be taken for

gaining command of the sea, probably the whole or nearly all of a possible enemy's ships could be placed in service for over-sea expeditions. For European troops from two or three net tons of shipping are required per man; for Asiatic troops, about one-half of that weight.

POSSIBLE INVADING ARMIES

The amount of steam ocean-going shipping available for expeditions of the various countries is approximately as follows:

	Tons
England .....	11,145,160
Germany .....	2,655,496

Germany had available 747 ocean-going steamships of 2,000 tons or more, some of them the largest carrying ships of the world. A conservative estimate of the number of troops which the average ship of this class can carry is 1,500. In 1912, German private shipyards turned out 927 vessels of a tonnage of 480,038 (including twenty-three war vessels of 52,062 tons).

	Tons.
Japan .....	1,430,329
France (223 ocean-going steamers).....	515,236
Italy (129 ocean-going steamers of more than 2,000 tons).....	369,000
Austria .....	407,061
Sweden (331 ocean-going steamers of more than 1,000 tons .....	636,125
Norway (total ocean-going steam and motor).....	1,718,606
Holland (367 ocean-going steamers).....	576,679

Speaking generally, the great nations of Europe can easily mobilize and embark their forces within one week after the declaration of, or intention of entering on, war; and from the time of leaving their home ports ten days may be considered as the time which will be required to cross the Atlantic Ocean. On the seventeenth day, therefore, the following forces could begin landing on this continent, provided sufficient command of the sea were obtained:

England .....	300,000 17th day
Germany .....	200,000 or more 17th day

On the Pacific Coast, counting one week for mobilization and twenty days for crossing the Pacific, the following number of Asiatic troops could begin landing:

Japan .....	200,000 27th day
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Should the above nations be in alliance with either Mexico or Canada, the following troops would be available:

Canada .....	40,000 10th day
Mexico for offensive purposes.....	60,000 10th day
<hr/>	
Total.....	800,000

This number could be brought against the United States with the present means of transportation available on the 27th day, but would involve a combination of all the powers enumerated, which is highly improbable. From this approximation, however, it can be seen what numbers would be available from combinations that might be effected by these nations. England with Canada could bring to bear 340,000 by the 17th day (40,000 Canadians on the tenth day); Germany, 200,000 on the 17th; if in alliance with Mexico, 60,000 in addition on the tenth day, or a total of 260,000 men; Japan, 200,000 on the 27th day; if in alliance with Mexico, 60,000 more. Any of the European nations able to command the sea have sufficient merchant marine, so that if political conditions at home were such as to enable them to detach troops from their country at will, they could within another month after their first landing bring their forces up to a million men on this continent. The only exception is England, where, although plenty of transportation is at hand, there is no such number of soldiers available. But as England has strong alliances with other European nations, they could furnish the troops.

Briefly stated, then, aside from the naval part of the problem, the solution which the United States must be ready to furnish is to meet successfully the following invading troops, either singly or together:

100,000 men on 10th day (Canada and Mexico).

200,000 to 300,000 European troops on the Atlantic Coast,  
17th day.

200,000 Asiatic troops on the Pacific Coast, 27th day.

500,000 men on the 27th day.

As has been shown, this is more of an understatement of the carrying capacities of the ships of the various nations than the reverse. Forces of the size mentioned, coming either from Europe or Asia, after they have once made a lodgment on American soil, can be rapidly reinforced until the million mark could probably be reached in from one to three months after the first landing in America.

The efficiency of these forces individually and collectively will be very high, especially after the present wars are completed. Whatever the outcome of the present European conflict may be, the military relation of Europe with respect to the United States will be stronger instead of weaker; that is, more trained men, both for army and navy, will be available, more material and equipment, and a thorough knowledge of the proper manner in which they can be applied to gain the maximum result. The military position of Japan is bound to be strengthened not only on account of her acquisition of strategically placed islands in the Pacific Ocean, but also on account of additions to her navy, army and merchant marine, which are constantly gaining in rapid proportion to these same things on the side of the United States.

An army prevents war in the same way that a police force keeps order in a city and a fire department keeps down fires. A disturbance may become too great for a police force and become a riot, but only because the police force has been slow to act, is deficient in numbers, or inefficient in the performance of its duty. A fire may get away from a fire department and become a conflagration. The principal duty of a fire department is to extinguish the fire quickly before it becomes a conflagration. The ability to get there with whatever equipment is necessary at the proper time corresponds to a military mobilization and concentration.

The two great foreign policies of the United States which

will probably be brought to the test some day are the Monroe Doctrine and the "Open Door" in China. These simply are necessary policies for the existence of the United States itself. The American continents are the richest undeveloped accessible parts of the earth's surface. The white race has gone as far east as it can in Asia. The Americas are the meeting ground. There are about 800,000,000 people in Asia; there are about 350,000,000 people in Europe; and 150,000,000 in both of the Americas. All people think they have a right to live and that their right is superior to the right of others. It is the same old story. The Panama Canal is the key point. The question whether a white or a yellow civilization shall predominate will be decided in America. If the nations inhabiting these continents are not prepared to defend themselves against all comers, they may go the way all weak nations have gone before, and their countries pass into the hands of a stronger, more efficient people.

It rests with the American people to determine what will be done under the circumstances.

### THE DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC

By George Haven Putnam, Vice President of the New York Peace Society, and late Major of United States Volunteers

The events of the European war have brought home to American citizens the necessity of giving thought to the defenses of the Republic. Inquiry is being made as to whether the resources of the United States have been so utilized that the Nation is now in a position to protect its own coasts; and whether, further, it is strong enough to take such action as may be required in connection with the obligations it has assumed outside of its immediate territory. If the defenses are at this time inadequate, it is necessary to decide what ought now to be done.

The experts appointed for the purpose have reported through the Government to the country that under present conditions it would not be practicable to prevent a hostile force from taking possession of our coast cities.

They report further that in case any European power should

undertake to occupy territory in South America or in Central America the United States would be impotent to prevent such occupation.

It is evident that the Government of the United States is derelict in its duty if it fails to take such measures as the experts report to be necessary to protect its own territory and resources, to maintain its independence, and to fulfill its obligations.

We have been told by the teachers of pacifism that if a nation will attend to its own business, will avoid acts of aggression, and will treat its neighbors in the family of nations with fairness and with good will, it will not itself be liable to attack. We have been reminded by these same pacifist teachers that the United States is protected from possible aggressors by not less than three thousand miles of ocean. We have been told further that our international relations have been so far established and confirmed by treaties that we can be in no risk of war unless we are foolish enough ourselves to be the aggressors. We have, however, learned that treaties and guarantees are no protection, and can, in fact, by ambitious and aggressive nations be treated as "scraps of paper" to be torn up at will.

Belgium presents a sad example of the failure of neutrality guaranties to prevent aggression and ruin when such guaranties stand in the way of an ambition for empire. We may learn from the recent history of China that distance is itself no protection.

In 1793 Washington wrote to Congress:

"If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be made known that we are at all times ready for war."

Washington could hardly be described as a jingo. He had at heart nothing but the interests of his country, and he realized that these interests depended largely upon the maintenance of peace; and yet Washington, at a time when it took months to move sailing vessels across the Atlantic, found ground for anxiety about the defenses of our coast.

Some years before the present war, a colonel of the Prussian staff, Freiherr von Edelsheim, brought into print in Berlin a small volume called "Operations on the Sea." In this volume the colonel presents, not as a dream or a romance based on mili-

tary possibilities, but in the form of a well-considered scientific scheme, a report of plans for the invasion and domination of Great Britain and for taking possession of certain coast cities in the United States.

It may, I think, be recognized that if Great Britain had at this time been carrying on war with Germany without the aid of her powerful allies, she would have been crushed, or would at least have come very near to destruction. The German colonel points out that as soon as coaling stations have been secured (by the appropriation of the British West Indies) on this side of the Atlantic the German fleet will be in a position to act against the United States. Writing four or five years before the present war, he shows that there were then available transports sufficient to ship two hundred and fifty thousand men a week for three weeks from the mouths of the Elbe, the Weser, and the Ems. He estimates, however, that the first two shipments would be sufficient for the purpose. He explains that there would be no idea of an assault in front of the fortifications of cities like New York and Boston. There is no difficulty, he points out (and in this he is, of course, right) with a selection of proper weather, in landing at Southampton (Long Island) the troops required for the occupation of New York. "The Americans have no army, and there would be nothing to withstand the advance of two or three German divisions. A similar course would be taken with Boston and Washington. These cities would be given the alternative of being destroyed or of putting themselves under bonds for satisfactory indemnities or ransoms." A thousand millions of dollars might be sufficient, he suggests, in the case of New York. "With the coast cities and the capital occupied, the Republic would crumble. \* \* \*

"We should have no need," the Colonel goes on, "to occupy the country as a whole; that would be a large task and would give no advantage. Our purpose would be accomplished when we had secured a dominating control over the policy of the United States."

We may ourselves not accept the conclusion that the occupation of the coast cities would bring about "the crumbling of the Republic." Chicago and Denver and San Francisco would have something to say to that. A resistance would be organized



and the invaders would in the end be thrown out; but think of the destruction of life and of resources that would be brought about by such an occupation and by the final struggle for independence! The development of the Republic would be put back for half a century or more! Are we willing to look forward to any such risk? Have we of this present generation the right to take any such chances?

A recent article in the "*Kölnische Zeitung*," written for the purpose of bringing the Americans into a proper state of mind in regard to such occurrences as the *Lusitania* horror, points out that the newly built German submarines have a radius of four thousand miles. "We are now in a position," said the writer, "when the proper time comes to dominate American as well as English commerce."

We may recall the disgrace that came upon the country when, in 1814, Washington was occupied and (to the disgrace of the British commander) was burned. At the time when 6,000 British took possession of the city of Washington we had 200,000 men under arms. These troops had been hastily collected, and had been brought together by method and preparation that may fairly be described as "hysterical." They were not organized forces. There was plenty of public spirit and of individual courage, but the men were not fit to fight together because they had not been trained together and they had had no previous relations with their commanders.

It is the recommendation of the pacifists, headed by the late Secretary of State, that we should delay preparing to resist invasion until there was immediate risk of war. What enemy, they inquire, is in sight? Why should we borrow trouble in advance? In replying to such a contention, one feels as if one were talking to children. When the enemy is in sight, it is already too late to make preparation. The million of men who would, as Mr. Bryan reports, "spring from the streets of the city and from the farms to the defense of the Republic" would be no good when they had reported themselves to the colors. They would have no training, no arms, no officers. They would constitute simply what the Germans call *canonen-futter*—food for powder. The pacifist teachers who are willing to send forward against disciplined soldiers unskilled and untrained citi-

zens are ready to sacrifice to no purpose the public spirit and the patriotism of the Republic.

Switzerland presents for us an example of what a patriotic and high-spirited nation is prepared to do for the purpose of maintaining its own independence and of fulfilling its neutrality obligations. Switzerland has had three hundred thousand trained citizens under arms for the defense of its frontier, and, however great may have been the temptation to Germany to press an army into southern France through Swiss territory, its three hundred thousand rifles in the hands of trained citizens have constituted a sufficient barrier to German aggression.

Holland had, in similar fashion, organized its resources for the defense alike of its sorely threatened independence and of its neutrality obligations. There is no necessity for the United States to accept a burden upon its resources in any way proportioned to that which is borne so sturdily by these two little neutral States.

If, however, we are prepared to maintain for our great Republic an assured defense and full independence of action, we must do something to arm and to train a proportion—a comparatively small proportion—of our citizens.

We are told by the pacifists that no war is impending; that there is no nation which would find it to its interests to attack the United States, and that by the time this war is over the European Powers will have been so far weakened that no one of them will be able to remain aggressive. We may hope that this war will result in the final smashing of militarism and in the defeat of the attempt of the Hohenzollerns to establish an Imperial domination; but what wise-minded American is willing to permit the maintenance of American independence to depend solely upon the chance that England and its allies may succeed? Why should we leave a duty that belongs to ourselves to be performed for us by the men on the other side of the Atlantic who are fighting in the cause of civilization?

National defense will cost money, but the cost will be small as compared with the enormous loss of resources that would be caused by a successful invasion, or even by a temporarily successful invasion, of our country. The "insurance" required is but a trifle in proportion to the property to be protected, but

the property is the smallest part of the matter. There are such things as National liberties, National policies, National obligation to be maintained which are still more precious than the value of a building in New York, in Boston, or in Washington.

We have had sermons from Mr. Bryan and others of his group as to the risk of corrupting the peaceful American character so that our own nation would take on a spirit of militarism and would become a peril to itself and to its neighbors. It is difficult to listen with a straight face to diatribes of this kind.

What intelligent American believes that there is any risk of this country being abused or dominated by a military spirit? The one time in our history when the possibility of military domination occurred was at the close of the Civil War. Critics in Germany were pointing out that the returning armies then had in their hands the destinies of the Republic and that there was serious chance that these half million or more of men might decide to take control of affairs into their own hands. Americans knew better. Their soldiers melted back into the ranks of citizens and returned to their peaceful vocations.

Today, after half a century of peace and with the interests of the country entirely absorbed in productive undertakings, what prospect is there that the people would be willing to create an army that would undertake to control the Republic, or that the material for such an army could be found? The little body of thirty odd thousand men which constitutes the present mobile force is hardly likely to "dominate the Republic." A police force organized for the maintenance of peace within our territories and for our contribution to the maintenance of peace throughout the world cannot carry with it—certainly not if made up with American material—any spirit of militarism.

Mr. Bryan and his group seemed to make no distinction between the fighting that is an aggression and the fighting that may be called for as an act of duty. If A and B have promised to protect the interests of a weaker brother, C, and if A finds B plundering C, and, in the dislike that always comes from oppression, abusing him as well as robbing him, has A no duty in the matter? Is it in order for A, while poor little C is being crushed out of existence, to fold his hands and say, "I believe in peace!" That was the relation that England and France bore to Bel-

gium, whose independence and whose liberties they had promised to protect. That is the relation that the United States now bears to the states of South America and of Central America. We must either prepare ourselves to fulfill this obligation or we must admit that we have accepted it without any intention of carrying it out. How many American citizens are ready to accept the humiliation of such an admission?

The pacifist who talks blandly about "the risk of war being slight," and says that he is willing "to take the chance," forgets that the chance is not his to take. The men of the present generation are not the owners of the United States. We hold simply in trust a heritage that has come to us from our fathers; and it is for us to hand down to our children unimpaired the dominions and the resources of the country. We hold also in trust the ideals of our Republic, its purposes, and its rightful influence in the adjustment of the problems of the world. It is for us now to take such wisely considered action as shall place us in a position to fulfill these trusts. We must be prepared to take our part in the settlement after this war, and to use the influence of the United States, which will come only if back of the influence there is evidence of organized powers, in behalf of the claims and the rights of oppressed peoples. We must see to it that in this settlement territories and peoples are no longer to be chucked over the table as if they were pawns or poker chips. It is for the United States to insist that in the controversial territories the people shall have a voice in the selection of their own government, and in the direction of the policy to be pursued by such a government.

### OUR NAVY IN THE EVENT OF WAR

(From the *Review of Reviews*, February, 1916.)

In his Manhattan Club speech in New York, last November, President Wilson declared that never in our history was the navy stronger and better prepared than at the present moment, and that all we have to do is to increase the pace and carry on the policies that have been pursued in the past. Taking issue with this roseate view of our naval preparedness, Mr. George

von L. Meyer, who was Secretary of the Navy under President Taft, points out in the *Yale Review* what he regards as serious defects in the equipment and personnel of our present naval organization.

In order that his readers may not infer that his judgment in these matters is a mere matter of individual opinion, Mr. Meyer reminds us that in the hearings before Congress less than a year ago, one of our officers testified that it would take five years to develop the organization of the navy department and the fleet to a high state of efficiency. Another officer high in authority, after calling attention to the remarkable work of the German army's general staff, announced that Congress has thus far failed to provide a general staff in our navy. "We have no tested war plans, no tested organization for war, no tested mobilization scheme; and, as to gunnery, our competitors have accomplished feats greater than any that we have ever attempted."

Mr. Meyer lays special emphasis on the shortage of men,—a condition that goes on from year to year without any serious attempt at remedy. It is well understood that, at the present time, a ship that has its full complement of men is a rare exception, and it is estimated that to provide the necessary crews for all the ships in the navy that would be useful in time of war would require twenty thousand additional men. Meanwhile, it is becoming more difficult, with the increased size of our ships, to provide them with sufficient crews when completed. The torpedo destroyers of the Atlantic fleet are twenty-five per cent short of their proper war complements. About a dozen destroyers are in reserve with half complements. About a dozen more are to be placed in reserve immediately, and only about twenty will be left in active service.

What could our navy do by way of protection of our coasts against a foreign invader? A report of a German general, published before the war, showed the possibility of Germany transporting to the United States and landing four army corps, convoyed by its fleet. It would seem that such a force might without difficulty secure a base extending twenty-four miles inland, and with the aid of the railroads to move men and siege-guns, this force would be able to threaten New York City with de-

struction and compel the payment of billions of dollars to the German invaders.

In Mr. Meyer's opinion, we can at the present time place no reliance on the submarine fleet to protect our coast. The German submarines, sailing four days in order to reach the Irish coast, have been able to patrol for thirteen days before returning to their base, requiring only ten days out of thirty for overhaul. Our best submarines, those of the K class, traversing the same distance as the German submarine, could stay but one day on patrol duty and be able to get back to their base for a ten-day overhaul.

Mr. Meyer's most serious criticisms of our naval administration are embodied in the following paragraphs from his article:

Are we to continue the policies which have resulted in a submarine flotilla that, according to the evidence of one of our most enlightened officers, had only a few submarines prepared for sea service when required for the maneuvers with the fleet last May and October, and only one fit and prepared for sea service this autumn?

Are we to go on falling far behind the other countries in the development of aeroplanes and hydroplanes, which have played such an important part in locating the armies of the enemy, the movements of ships, the position of hidden batteries, and have been instrumental in driving off the enemies' airships? The arming of airships has taken great strides, and yet we have no equipment in that direction worthy of mention.

The great naval powers have seen the necessity of concentrating fleets in two or three stations, and that it is not advisable or advantageous to have a great naval base in a commercial harbor. Realizing this, England, at an expense of over \$20,000,000, has established a great naval base at Rosyth. Five years ago, a naval board of experts recognized the importance and great value of Narragansett Bay as a naval base, with its vast anchorage, natural depth of water, and two entrances of easy defense. Captains of industry have appreciated that it is cheaper to dismantle plants which are unprofitable and to concentrate at advantageous locations.

Finally, what he regards as the fundamental defect of the Navy Department is its lack of a competent military organization, charged with the preparation of the fleets for war and with their conduct in war. As a consequence our navy is being built and administered on a peace basis, and not being efficiently

prepared for war service. Our leading naval officers have for years advocated the organization of a general staff, but Congress has always refused to grant it. It should be clearly understood, says Mr. Meyer, that even though Congress were to appropriate for a navy as large and as well built as that of Great Britain, and to supply it with the necessary number of officers and men, it could not be used efficiently against a powerful enemy unless it had in time of peace been supplied with a directing brain, a general staff, to equip it for war, and train it in war duties.

#### HAVE WE A NAVAL POLICY?

A distinguished officer of our navy, Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, writing in the *North American Review*, declares that every great naval power in the world except our own has worked out for itself a definite policy, having first decided what it ought to do and then how to do it. In the case of the United States, however, there has been no deliberate adoption of a definite naval policy.

Ever since its beginning, in 1775, the United States has excelled both in the material and the personnel of its navy. As Admiral Fiske points out, our ships have always been good, and in many cases have surpassed those of similar kind in other navies. He attributes this fact to the strong common-sense of the American people, their engineering skill, and their inventive genius. He reminds us that the first warship in the world to move under steam was the American ship *Demologos*, sometimes called the *Fulton the First*, constructed in 1813; the first electric torpedoes were American; the first submarine to do effective work in war was American; the first turret ship, the *Monitor*, was American; the first warship to use a screw propeller was the *Princeton*, an American; and the Admiral adds that the naval telescope sight was an American invention, although he modestly refrains from stating that he himself was the inventor. Admiral Fiske not only has a good opinion of the construction of American ships of today, but considers their equipment of the best, and regards the American battleship as the finest and most powerful vessel of her class in the world.

As to personnel, the American seaman has always excelled,

and so has the American gunner. No ships, says Admiral Fiske, have ever been better handled than the American ships; no naval battles in history have been conducted with more skill and daring than those of American ships; no exploits in history surpass those of Cushing, Hobson, and Decatur.

In spite of the excellent account that our men and ships have given of themselves, it appears that in the handling of the navy as a whole we have never excelled; though, in Admiral Fiske's opinion, no better individual fleet leaders shine in the pages of all history than Farragut and Dewey. Instead of operating our material and personnel in accordance with carefully laid plans, the matter has been left largely to the inspiration of the commander on the spot. Both material and personnel have suffered from lack of a naval policy, but operation has suffered incomparably more. Since the people do not comprehend the supreme importance of being ready when war breaks out to operate the material and personnel skilfully against an active enemy in accordance with well-prepared strategic plans, they fail to provide the necessary administrative machinery.

Admiral Fiske attributes the success of the British navy in the present war not so much to the individual courage and ability of the officers and men, or even to their skill in handling their ships in squadrons, as to the fact that a definite naval policy has been followed. In other words, "the British nation has had a perfectly clear realization of what it wants the navy to do, and the navy has had a perfectly clear realization of how to do it."

If this country should decide that the navy must be so prepared that, say twenty years hence, it will be able to protect the country against any enemy, there would be for us the distinct advantage of "having ahead of us a definite, difficult thing to do, which will at once take us out of the region of guesswork and force us into logical methods. We shall realize the problem in its entirety; we shall realize that the deepest study of the wisest men must be devoted to it, as it is in all maritime countries except our own."



## AN AMERICAN NAVY AT LAST

(*World's Work*, Vol. 32, page 608)

To appreciate properly just what the new Navy bill does for the United States, we should compare the American battle fleet, when these new ships are finished, with the fleets of the great European Powers at the beginning of the present war. Naval experts now estimate the fighting abilities of navies by capital ships—that is, by dreadnaughts and battle cruisers. Smaller battleships and cruisers may do effective work under certain circumstances; these older vessels, however, do not belong in the first line of battle. All other vessels such as scouts, destroyers, and submarines are intended chiefly as supporters of the great battle fleet. To measure our strength against other navies, therefore, we should take the capital ships as the unit of value.

England entered the present war with 29 capital ships. Germany began operations with 17, France had 4, and Japan 4. All these nations had many big vessels under construction—England 17 and Germany 11, all of which have probably long since been finished. The figures for capital ships given above, however, are those published by our own Navy Department on July 1, 1914.

At present the United States has 17 capital ships, all of which are battleships built and building. The sixteen authorized by the new bill will give a battle fleet of 33 ships. If the *Michigan* and the *South Carolina* are included in the dreadnaught fleet—and certain authorities do include them—our force of capital ships will be increased to 35.

Measured by the standard of two years ago, this means a powerful navy. The new building plan will give us, when finished, a much greater Navy than that with which England entered the European war.

It is stronger than Germany's ante-bellum fleet by eighteen ships, and immensely greater than the fleet of France and Japan and the other naval powers. This comparison, however, has certain limitations. We are placing our fleet, as it will be about 1922, with the fleets of our main rivals as they were in

July, 1914. Just what England, Germany, and Japan have been doing in the last two years we do not know. England certainly has been building at an enormous rate since the war began. Her building facilities are on a huge scale and, according to all reports, are constantly adding to the fleet. Despite large losses, the English navy is immensely stronger now than when the war began. Germany, also, has probably been building at a furious rate, and there are suspicions that Japan has been secretly adding to her dreadnaught fleet. On the other hand, should the great naval battle between Germany and England ever be fought to a finish, the losses might reduce both navies to a point where ours would be as large, or even larger, than either. In all likelihood, however, the United States will have to adopt an immensely greater naval program than our present one if we are ever to equal or surpass England's. Perhaps the new bill will give us a larger fleet by 1922 than Germany's, and almost certainly it will place us far ahead of Japan and other naval Powers.

But the really important thing is that the American people are showing signs of taking their navy seriously. The Army bill shows that public opinion has not developed to the extent that demands an efficient military force. In time we shall probably learn the need of a general army; apparently we have not yet reached that stage of national advancement. Clearly, however, the American people, as a mass, do demand a Navy—hence the present appropriation, the largest ever made by any nation in time of peace. This new spirit is worth far more, as a national asset, than the new ships and the new men. It is a spirit that will always watch jealously the Navy's interests, demand its adequate support, and not tolerate again a decadence such as had taken place in the last eight years. There is more in this new Navy bill than ships and ammunition. The bill gives us practically a general staff—a force of naval experts, directly under the civilian Secretary of the Navy, whose business it will be to keep the Navy constantly prepared for war. It also provides an increase from 51,000 to 68,700 in men, with an increase, in case of emergency, to 87,000. We shall have a naval reserve, a flying corps, a selection of officers by fitness instead of seniority. All these are reforms for which the friends

of the Navy have been struggling for years. The fact that Congress has finally granted them, under pressure of a powerful public opinion, shows that we have seriously undertaken the business of organizing a Navy worthy of the Nation.

### VILLA'S LESSON

(*World's Work*, Vol. 32, No. 1.)

A week or two after the pursuit of Villa began, the lessons of his raid on Columbus assumed far deeper significance than the mere bandit hunt of which we read from day to day in the newspapers. But whether or not Villa got away, whether some traitor betrayed him alive, or a tempting reward delivered him up, dead, to American justice; whether the waste places of Durango and Sinaloa swallowed him up, or like a burly will-o'-the-wisp, continuing to elude capture, he strung out more than a third of the United States Army in a baffled thin thread far down into Mexico—all this became of relatively small concern to us. The thing that did assume greater proportions in our eyes was the exposition of the state of our Army which Villa's raid made.

As the consequence of a border raid it became almost immediately necessary to drain the entire continental United States of all its mobile military forces, with the exception of six skeleton regiments not even recruited up to their peace basis. It also became immediately evident that if what had been planned as a bandit hunt should result in anything more serious those six regiments would hardly form an additional drop in the military bucket. The President would have to call on the country for volunteers and he would have to use untrained men immediately. Out of eight aeroplanes representing the entire available Army equipment all but two were out of commission within a week. Villa loafed away with a week's start because he knew then what we know now, that along the entire Mexican frontier there was not in existence a single supply train which could have made immediate pursuit possible. These and other matters of unsparing detail Villa wrote on the international wall where we could see them.

Villa produced a bloody corroboration of the President's state-

ment that he did not have enough men properly to patrol the border. There are certainly not enough regulars to patrol the border and to do any extended police work in Mexico, and in any other contingency which might arise we are almost certain to have to rely in large part on untrained or very meagerly trained troops.

### WHAT ABOUT AN ARMY?

(Abstract of an article by Mr. Peter Clark McFarlane in "Colliers" for March 17, 1917.)

Today a situation confronts us where the nation may have to lean heavily upon the army, and the army is unready. What is more astounding, nothing is being done to get it ready—so far as immediate preparations are concerned.

If we consider the army as a whole, the following situation is encountered. The mobile part of it—only 43,000 men in the United States—has been mobilized for practically five years; yet it is totally unequipped to face a modern enemy. It is underhosed, undermanned, undergunned. The regiments are half strength. There is not a piece of modern heavy field artillery made or even designed. There is not a fighting aeroplane. There is no equipment for a modern system of fire control, observation balloons, aerial radio apparatus and so forth. We have no modern bombs or trench mortars. We had to strip Panama to get wireless apparatus for the Mexican border.

There are shortages of signaling apparatus. We lack reserves of rifles and light artillery, and adequate reserves of ammunition, of shoes, of clothing, and of other individual equipment. We could not equip an army of half a million men within a year.

The European War has been going on for over two years and a half, but seems to have brought no lessons home to those who make the conditions under which our army must do its work. Pictures and details of the new and wonderful heavy guns in use upon the foreign fields have been published in the scientific magazines of America, but either it has occurred to no one in authority in the Government to have such a gun

made or such a carriage under construction, or else no one has been permitted to do it. This becomes doubly significant when it is realized that none of the new long-range field guns of middle size which have proved so destructive in Europe are being made in this country by our private ordnance builders. This Government will have to create its own if they are to be created.

The British allotment of machine guns is 72 to each 2,000 men, while our allotment is but 6; and that in the face of the dreadful experience abroad which is perfectly well known to us all. The Government has not even decided what type of heavy machine gun it will use, let alone beginning to manufacture it.

Not only have we inadequate reserves of rifles for regulars and militia, but there is today not a rifle for the volunteers. Of field artillery there is not enough to equip the regular army and militia at war strength. The heaviest of this artillery is but 4.7 and 6-inch, and there is very little of that. So equipped, an army of ours could not stand for a day before one supported by the huge field guns and the giant howitzers employed by the first-class military powers. To illustrate: Suppose Japan should land within thirty days upon the Pacific Coast an expeditionary force equal to our entire mobile army at the present time, 43,000 men—a thing she could readily do. Judging by our experience with the National Guard, we could swiftly oppose her with, all told, 150,000 men; yet our army would be ineffective because of weakness in artillery. Meantime the expeditionary force would be constantly reinforced, and our troops could do nothing but retire, leaving the invaders to subjugate the country at their leisure while we waited the year or year and a half necessary to design and manufacture the heavy artillery required to enable our troops to engage the enemy successfully.

## **SELECTED ARGUMENTS AGAINST INCREASED MILITARY PREPAREDNESS**

### **AMERICA'S BID FOR SEA POWER**

BY ARCHIBALD HURD

At a moment when seven of the great maritime nations of the world are gripped in the toils of war, the eighth, the United States, is embarking on ambitious schemes of naval expansion. America already possesses a war fleet, which includes 32 battleships—12 of them Dreadnaughts—besides 14 armored cruisers, 15 protected cruisers (obsolescent), 3 small scouts, over 60 destroyers, more than half as many submarines, and 30 gunboats; 7 more Dreadnaughts (each of about 30,000 tons displacement and costing, in the aggregate, about \$21,000,000), 17 torpedo boat destroyers, 3 fleet submarines, 35 submarines and 6 auxiliary vessels are under construction. It is now proposed to adopt a five-year building program—1917-21—which is estimated to require an expenditure of \$100,000,000. So far as merchant shipping is concerned, the United States owns nearly 6,000,000 tons, including ships on the Great Lakes; according to the latest returns of the Bureau of Navigation of the Department of Commerce 360 more merchant ships of 1,067,856 gross tons are being built. The United States, it is apparent, is making a strong bid for sea power, in which ships of commerce as well as ships of war are included.

Europe's embarrassment is regarded as America's opportunity. That statement, cynical in its implication, reflects only half the truth. The course of the war has revealed the value of ships of war, both for offense and defense, just as it has exhibited the weakness of the United States' mercantile marine and the dependence of this great people on foreign tonnage. In consequence of the horrors enacted in Europe, the main issue at the approaching Presidential election will not be preparedness for the conquests of peace, but preparedness for the rigors of war. In official quarters the possibility of America becoming

involved in war in the future is admitted. Hostilities in the Pacific are looked upon by responsible politicians and others as possible. Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, the President of the War College and a member of the General Naval Board over which Admiral Dewey presides, in giving evidence recently before a Congressional Committee even went so far as to state that he "was not sure we are not going to fight England" and urged that the United States should have the largest navy in the world. There is also a determined movement for strengthening the American mercantile marine. Some form of compulsory military service is advocated, and it is also urged that a Territorial Army should be provided. But the main issue is maritime, because the United States is pre-eminently a maritime country.

The popular movement in favor of the rapid expansion of the war fleet has already produced its effect on President Wilson's administration. The Democrats came into power pledged to naval economy, and now that the Party has again to face the electors while the world-war is in progress, the Government is not only devoting attention to the strengthening of the mercantile marine by exclusive legislation, but has submitted to Congress the most ambitious program of warship construction ever conceived on the other side of the Atlantic. The scheme embraces an expenditure in the next five years—1917 to 1921—of just over \$100,000,000 on naval construction—that is, apart from naval maintenance, repairs, pay, etc., of the existing fleet—and even that amount will not be sufficient to complete the last of the ships which Congress is asked to vote. The following are details of this ambitious program:

	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	Total
Dreadnoughts .....	2	2	2	2	2	10
Battle cruisers .....	2	..	1	2	1	6
Scout cruisers .....	3	1	2	2	2	10
Destroyers .....	15	10	5	10	10	50
Fleet submarines .....	5	4	2	2	2	15
Coast submarines .....	25	15	15	15	15	85
Gunboats .....	2	1	..	..	1	4
Hospital ships .....	1	..	..	..	..	1

	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	Total
Ammunition ships .....	..	..	..	1	1	2
Fuel oil ships .....	..	1	..	1	..	2
Repair ships .....	..	..	..	..	1	1

Provision is also made for a large expenditure on aviation and on the provision of a reserve of ammunition, \$5,000,000 being set aside for the latter purpose.

It is calculated by the General Board that if this program is carried out the United States navy will be composed of the following vessels, built or building, in 1921:

Battleships, first line .....	27	58 capital ships
Battle cruisers .....	6	
Battleships, second line (Pre-Dreadnoughts) .....	25	
Armored cruisers .....	10	
Scout cruisers .....	13	
Cruisers, first class .....	5	*
Cruisers, second class .....	3	
Cruisers, third class .....	10	
Destroyers .....	108	
Fleet submarines .....	18	
Coast submarines .....	157	
Monitors .....	6	
Gunboats .....	20	
Supply ships .....	4	
Fuel ships .....	15	
Transports .....	4	
Tenders to torpedo vessels .....	3	
Special types .....	8	
Ammunition ships .....	2	

It is estimated that each battleship will involve an expenditure of about \$3,750,000, each battle cruiser \$3,500,000, and each scout cruiser \$1,000,000. The most expensive battleship in the British Fleet, of which official figures are available, is the

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\*These ships are already obsolescent, and under modern conditions, owing to their low speed, have small value.



*Iron Duke*, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe's flagship, of 25,000 tons placement, which cost just over \$2,000,000, and the British battle cruiser on which most money was spent is the *Queen Mary*, the outlay being about \$2,100,000. In other words, the proposed type of American battleship involves the investment of a sum 87.5 per cent higher and the corresponding American battle cruiser an amount of 66.6 per cent higher than we, in our days of greatest extravagance, have devoted to ships of these classes. And yet it has been argued that the day of the big armored ship is over. The highest professional authorities of the United States Navy are not of that opinion, but propose a greater expenditure on a smaller number of capital ships than has ever before been suggested.

In his report to Congress the Secretary of the Navy has put forward a justification of the new program, the most noteworthy feature of which is the appearance of the battle cruiser, on which, prior to the war in Europe, officers of the United States Navy looked with little favor, though they had been built for the British Fleet for nine years before hostilities opened. "The lessons of the European War," the Secretary states, "warns us that it is better to spend money in time of peace for preparation than to run the risk, however remote, of sorely wanting ships and munitions if suddenly needed."

Turning from this condemnation of the submarine, which, could they read it, would make German civilians open their eyes in wonder and incredulity, the General Board proceed to an explanation of the needs of the United States Navy in respect of other types of ships. For twelve years past not a single cruiser—large or small—has been built, with the result that the American fleet is the blindest of all the naval forces of the world; as the Navy Secretary has admitted, it has only three scout cruisers, besides a group of obsolescent and slow armored and protected cruisers. A new policy in this respect is recommended and embodied, though somewhat half-heartedly, in the five-year program. The General Board has explained its views.

The United States Navy has hitherto been somewhat ill-balanced as to the different types of ships represented in it, as battleships need auxiliaries of every sort, both combatant and

administrative, for their support in battle and in being. These auxiliaries have not been authorized in proper proportion.

With its two extensive coast-lines, the United States offers great opportunities to an enemy to descend by surprise upon its shores. To meet such attack the tendency of the country is to place too much reliance upon localized defenses, such as fortifications, mines, and submarines. These are essential, but these alone cannot accomplish the desired purpose. The aim should be to meet the enemy at a distance and defeat him before he reaches the neighborhood of the coasts. For this purpose the country must rely upon the sea-going fleet. To forestall the attack of the enemy our main fighting force must be concentrated at a strategic center, ready to move and defeat the hostile main body before it has entered an area where its presence is seriously dangerous to this country's interests. When concentrated, the main fleet can expect to move in time to forestall the enemy's intentions only if it has an adequate information service to provide early and continuous intelligence of the enemy's movements. An efficient scouting force composed of battle cruisers and scouts must be thrown far beyond the main body to assure this indispensable service of information, which cannot otherwise be secured. In default of information, the main fleet can only act blindly.

In the general development of our naval strength, the time has now come to provide for battle cruisers and scouts. The main duty of both types is to get information. For this purpose numbers are necessary, and to provide these numbers without undue cost we have recourse to the scout type, wherein the size is as small as will afford adequate speed and radius for the accomplishment of the work. A scout in pursuance of her duties should rather avoid than seek battle. Yet she must seek and maintain contact with the enemy, and, therefore, cannot dispense with a small armament for her protection when unavoidably forced into an engagement by ships which she cannot evade.

So much for the naval proposals which have been submitted to Congress. To what extent they are merely political window-dressing, it is impossible to state. At any rate, if they are unpopular with some sections of the Democratic party, they are

regarded by many Republicans as erring on the side of moderation.

In the meantime the task of expanding the American merchant navy is being pressed forward with energy in all the shipbuilding yards of the United States. The American merchant fleet has never recovered from the injury which it received during the Civil War. Prior to that event, as Mr. John D. Long has recorded, "two-thirds of the foreign trade of the United States was carried in ships flying the Stars and Stripes. Our shipping represented 5,250,000 tons which was valued at \$275,000,000 (about £55,000,000). The extraordinary character of the emergency demanded that much of this tonnage should be impressed into the naval and military services. One million eight hundred thousand tons were taken, and one hundred million dollars withdrawn from the capital embarked in the shipping industry. The *Alabama*, the Confederate tiger of the sea, destroyed one hundred thousand tons of shipping and caused the owners of vessels to seek foreign registries or tie their craft to the dock rather than send them, unprotected, on voyages which were likely to end in the prize court or destruction by fire at sea. Foreign ships and foreign capital eagerly entered the industry which the United States was compelled to abandon. From the damage inflicted upon our merchant marine during the Civil War there has been, as yet, no full recovery; and the stupendous increase in our foreign trade is the more remarkable in view of the fact that it has been effected in spite of the disadvantage of its conveyance in ships flying the flags of other nations than our own."

Admiral Fletcher afterwards turned to the consideration of the condition of the *materiel* of the Fleet. While he admitted that, in general, the *materiel* condition of the battleship squadrons was "very good both in hull and machinery," he pointed out that, with the possible exception of the *Kansas*, the six modern battleships of the Connecticut class were unreliable at fleet speed owing to their defective shafting. Turning to the cruiser squadron—too small for its work—he admitted that its condition was not satisfactory, and the same verdict, more strongly worded, was passed on the submarine flotilla. "While there

are twelve submarines in full commission assigned to operate with the fleet, only six of these vessels were in condition to proceed to Pensacola for the winter's work. All twelve were assembled in May in New York, but only ten were available for the war problem, May 18th-25th. Of these ten a number were soon incapacitated by machinery troubles, and at times not more than five submarines were ready for duty. Due to untrained crews some of the five were not ready to undertake submerged work." His testimony with reference to destroyers was not more consolatory. "There are at present attached to the fleet eleven destroyers with one-half complements, a makeshift brought about by the shortage of *personnel*. As a result of this shortage the training of those destroyers is not complete, and the limiting conditions brought about by the restricted activities of one-half complements lead to false conclusions and requirements." Finally, he directed attention to the absence of heavily-armored fast vessels and light cruisers, commented on the absence of suitable mine-sweeping vessels, and reported that "there are no anti-aircraft guns supplied to vessels of the fleet." At the same time the Admiral contended that a marked improvement had been effected in target practice.

Whatever course the war in Europe may take, the adoption of these proposals would render the United States Fleet second only in strength, so far as paper calculations go, to the British Fleet. It is the opinion of American naval officers, however, that hostilities will not close without a battle action on a grand scale, necessarily resulting in the loss of many British and German ships. In that event, it is evidently assumed that the American Fleet may find itself not inferior even to the British Fleet. Whether, on the other hand, naval opinion on the other side of the Atlantic will succeed in prevailing upon Congress to reform the Navy Department so as to give professional opinion greater weight, and thus raise the war efficiency of the Fleet, and to create a General Staff is open to serious doubt. American politicians, irrespective of party, have always insisted on undisputed political control of the services, and nothing has yet occurred to suggest that this attitude will change.

Whatever action Congress may take with reference to the

proposals for adding to the strength of the American Fleet, the putting forward of a shipbuilding scheme involving the expenditure of \$100,000,000 by the Democratic Party, pledged to retrenchment on armaments, at the time of the last Presidential election, is a development which merits attention on this side of the Atlantic. That ambitious scheme has already received the full approval of President Wilson, who is a pacifist statesman. His administration has apparently not been unconscious of the apparent inconsistency exposed by an examination of the principles of his party in contrast with the costly naval program submitted to Congress. Mr. Daniels has been constituted the spokesman of the party. After referring to his previous endorsements of the proposed "naval holiday," the last in his 1914 report, he remarks:

"The hope I then entertained for an international understanding to end competition in costly building programs I still cherish. While conditions today are such that no suggestion looking to an international agreement could probably be made with prospect of certain success, I entertain the sincere desire that when peace is restored the suggestions made in my report may be considered and approved by the great navy-building nations of the world."

This, we have been told by British pacifists, is to be the last of all wars; it is to arrest naval competition throughout the world. The Democratic administration of the United States, in spite of Mr. Daniels' words, does not seriously entertain that anticipation. America already possesses a navy larger than the navies either of France, Italy, Russia, Austria-Hungary, or Japan, and comparable, bearing in mind strategical and other considerations, to the German Fleet. Nevertheless, while the Great War, which may perchance lead to a great reduction of naval strength in European waters, is still in progress, the United States Congress is being urged to adopt the most costly and ambitious naval program ever submitted to it or any other democratic legislative body.

## OUR DRIFT INTO MILITARISM

## SIGNIFICANT FACTS FOR THINKING PEOPLE

By Oswald Garrison Villard

In his telegram of acceptance, Mr. Hughes said flatly that he did not believe that this country was in any danger of militarism. I have been wondering ever since whether his absorption in the duties of the Supreme Court has not, perhaps, led him to overlook certain very plain manifestations of the militaristic spirit in this country. He is aware, of course, that the Naval bill, just passing with its stupendous appropriations of fifty years ago, and that it is the largest single proposal for ships of war ever passed at one time by any Christian nation, containing a more menacing naval programme even than the German expansion of 1901, which had so much to do with the coming on of the present terrible conflict. Mr. Hughes ought to be not unaware that in Japan this tremendous naval expansion of ours is considered a direct menace to the safety of Japan, upon which issue its ministry has been violently attacked, and urged largely to increase its navy. He ought to know that even before the outbreak of the war the menace of the American fleet was cited in the Reichstag, the House of Commons, in Japan's Parliament, and in France as a reason for increasing the naval appropriations of those countries.

If it be objected that militarism is a state of mind, then what shall we say to the actions of our best-known Rear Admiral, who goes up and down the country publicly declaring that the army and navy of the United States shall carry the American flag to Cape Horn? Is not this militarism? In no other nation would this be tolerated. And yet he is unrebuked, and so is General Wood, who in deliberate defiance of the order of Secretary Garrison, in January, 1915, forbidding the very thing, has made several hundred speeches in regard to our preparedness, visiting every boys' school of note to hold up the military ideal as the highest good for Americans. This same officer was one of those who induced the Postmaster General to exclude

from the mail an alleged Socialistic criticism of the army. The German General Staff would have done no less, and would but have accomplished the same. Is it without significance that in Cleveland men have been sent to jail for ten and thirty days, respectively, merely for criticising the National Guard; that in Iowa a small boy was sentenced to jail for nine years for refusing to salute the flag in school? Then there has been a widespread demand for the dismissal of the able and competent Assistant Secretary of Labor because he thinks soldiers a feudal anachronism. A public meeting has been broken up by soldiers in uniform in Brooklyn because a speaker dared to criticise the immorality of the army, which a Republican Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, has denounced as worse than any other army in the world, as attested by the statistics of foul diseases. What clearer instances than these, which are not exceptional, could be given of a new American but old Prussian attitude toward the army—that it is sacrosanct.

There is no more dangerous lobby at Washington than the army and navy, for it is on the job all the time, and it speaks with official and a wholly undeserved professional authority. Behind it are all the officers of the army and navy. Fifteen hundred new ones are to be appointed this year, and many more in the next few years, all of them centres of military agitation and infection—all of them openly working for the aggrandizement of their caste, just as the entire National Guard constituted a united lobby for the defeat of the Continental Army and the enhancement of their own service. Never in the history before this have we built up a military machine in this country comprising men remaining at home and exercising their political power to further their own profits. These men are now being paid—for the first time. There are to be four hundred thousand of them; does the history of our Grand Army agitation for pensions suggest anything in this connection, or not? Is their pay likely to be increased soon or not? Here in New York State there has been enacted by trickery a bit of militarism unheard of even in Germany. I refer to the conscription of all boys of well-to-do parents—note the democracy of the law—and the statute giving the Governor of New York power to draft into active military service in peace times any citizens of the

State. As the President of the United States, since July 1, has the power to turn every militiaman into a regular by a stroke of his pen, a citizen of New York may suddenly find himself a private soldier in the regular army for six years, whether he wills it or not, whether he has conscientious scruples against bearing arms or not, and this may happen in time of peace as well as in time of war.

This strikes deliberately at one of the most sacred American liberties, the right of freedom of thought, of action, and of conscience, since it excepts not even Quakers, as England excepts them today. Yet militarism has no foothold among us! Finally, we have the widespread demand for universal military service, echoed by certain newspapers and politicians, although it is universal military service which led to the Prussianizing of all Germany in forty years. Never was there a less militarily inclined people than the Bavarians. In my lifetime they have been Prussianized. Yet we actually believe that we can take the same road without the same results; that human nature is different in America than elsewhere. The introduction of universal military service even on the lines of Switzerland and Australia, about which we know very little, except that it has bred much dissatisfaction in Australia and that the Swiss system is wholly inapplicable to a continent, would create so vast a machinery of administration as to subordinate every other department of the Government in numbers and appropriations. Germany has had 800,000 men under arms under her universal service; we should have fully 1,500,000. In its every manifestation, moreover, the movement is undemocratic, and, therefore, un-American. Nothing is more absurd than the statement that a universal army is a democratic one. The prime military teaching is that the soldier shall subordinate will, thought, conscience to his superior.

It is all putting the emphasis on the wrong thing—this exacting of force and brute power above the things of the spirit. It is distracting attention from the great democratic experiment as it is robbing every forward movement in America of means to carry it on. It is a *destructive* policy instead of the *constructive* policy of facing squarely toward a world federa-



tion, or at least the freeing of the world from the fear of one nation by another, this militarism for defence only, which is the most successful device yet invented by tyrants for keeping their peoples despotically enslaved. As President Madison phrased it, large armies and heavy taxes are the best possible means of putting in the hands of a few complete power over the many. Mr. Hughes will not, of course, have been deceived by the preparedness parades, into many of which city employees and those of large corporations were dragooned. He can surely not have been deceived by the plea that this is for preparedness at the close of this war, for he knows that the ships just authorized will not be ready for eight or ten years, nor the new armies for five. We are arming not against a victorious Japan and German in 1916 or 1917, but are arming to be a menace to the world five years from now when the European war will be fading into the background.

Mr. Hughes is too keen not to know that the outcry for more soldiers comes not from the masses of the people, but particularly from the very classes that have heretofore batted upon special privilege. It is but a new phase of the old battle of democracy against privilege, in which many of us took part joyfully under his leadership as Governor of New York. Before he considers further statements on this question of preparedness he ought to study carefully the forces behind it, the reasons why the enormous sums we have expended have been so wantonly wasted, when, as Secretary Stimson says, they have been quite large enough to have prepared us effectively for defense, whether the entrusting of enormous sums to the same agents will mean less waste and more efficiency, the effect that this armament will have upon the terrible conditions in the Old World, and above all, whether we are not creating right here in our America a political-military machine which will yet subordinate the civilian to itself and become as in Germany insidiously, unsuspectedly, little by little, a menace to social development, to our own liberties, and to the peace of the world.

## A PLEA FOR PACIFISM.

“Will America Yield to the Armament Madness?” By  
Washington Gladden.

(From *The Nation*, August 3, 1916.)

The policy of preparedness may be advocated by honest men, but it has a way of working out its own results. Armaments mean war, and sooner or later they bring war. Of course, they are for self-defence. All the belligerents on the continent of Europe are fighting on the defensive. Ask them! Now that is the logic of preparedness. No matter what you intend by it, that is what it means; you never can make it mean anything else. The kindling of suspicions and fears always will go hand in hand with the work of building the armament.

One fact we may as well face. If we are going to have war indefinitely, it will not be the same kind of war, it will wax worse and worse continually. Experience makes that plain. This war is immeasurably worse, more fierce, more relentless, more inhuman than any war in history. And the next war, for which we are urged to get ourselves in a state of preparedness, will be so much more diabolical than this, as this is more devilish than any which has preceded it. Thousands of minds, furnished with all the resources of Kultur, will be constantly at work inventing new machinery for mangling men; new methods of inflicting torture; new appliances for erasing the beauty of the earth and ruining its fairest monuments, for making its loveliest lands uninhabitable.

You know that this principle of preparedness ruled, not very long ago, in all our private life, and especially in the highest ranks. Every gentleman went armed. You might or might not have a shirt, but you must have a sword. Now in those old days of preparedness homicide was as common as eggs for breakfast. The time came when it seemed to many men that they had some better thing to do than to keep themselves always in a state of preparedness for war. They began to say, “What mortal reason have we for hating and fighting our

neighbors? It is monstrous. It is ridiculous. It is not economical." What did they do about it? Why, they outlawed it. They said, "The thing for us to get rid of is this whole business of preparedness. We will have no more of it. The man who goes about with pistols and rapiers in his belt is not a hero, he is a ruffian, he is an undesirable citizen. He keeps the air full of explosive material. Let him remove himself out of our sight. We can get along without him very well."

What happened then? Why, homicide and violence practically came to an end; at any rate they were greatly abated. Peace returned to earth. Security began to reign. What was the cause of this change? Was it trust in the police? Not at all. It was trust in one another. It was the replacing of the ape and tiger psychology of human relation by the human psychology of good-will. Instead of seeing in every unknown man an enemy or an assassin, they began to assume that every unknown man was a neighbor and a friend. Where that trust in one another exists, you have peace and security; where it is absent, though your streets are full of policemen and there is a jail on every square, you will always be in fear and in peril.

We all know which way we want history to go, and we can help it to go that way if we are strongly going that way ourselves. But we shall not help it to go that way if we ourselves are going the other way; if we are building ships, enlisting soldiers, increasing armaments.

Of course, we are going to build these ships and enlist these armies that we are now talking about for purely defensive purposes. For defence against whom? I doubt whether any nation on the face of the earth entertains toward us any purposes of aggression. Such purposes may be excited in some nation by the increase of our armaments, for no such construction ever goes on without guiding the thought of the people toward some suspected foe, and that is a secret which cannot be kept; the suspicion and the fear will stir resentment and hostility somewhere. But every nation on the earth which might be such a foe knows today that we are not now and cannot be for twenty years in any danger from her. All these nations, broken, wasted, battered, and torn as they will be when they come out of this war, will know that we have no reason to be afraid of ag-

gression from them. You know how easy it is to awaken national jealousies. Would it be strange if some of them should conclude that our defensive policy is a mask for some sinister design? If, as I strongly believe, no nation will be in condition to attack us within twenty years, then the ships which we build now will be junk before we have ever used them. It is safe to wait until the congress of the nations following this war. If it concludes to perpetuate militarism and preparedness and forces us to face the return of Hades, then we will have time, if we think it needful to get ready for that emergency. But if, on the other hand, it concludes to free the world from the scourge of war, we shall not only have some big and needless bills to pay, but shall be very much ashamed of ourselves.

Was not that a pathetic note that was sounded across the sea a few days ago from one of the wisest and sanest of the English statesmen, not now in office, Lord Roseberry?

"I know nothing more disheartening than the announcement recently made that the United States, the one great country in the world free from the hideous bloody burden of war, is about to embark upon the building of a huge armada destined to be equal or second to our own. *It means that the burden will continue upon the other nations and be increased in proportion of the fleet of the United States.* I confess that it is a disheartening prospect that the United States, so remote from the European conflict, should voluntarily in these days take up the burden which, after the war, will be found to have broken, or almost broken, our backs."

It is not from England alone that this warning comes. Perhaps the most trenchant and influential pen in Berlin is that of Maxmillian Harden. And what says Maxmillian Harden today?

"I find that the time has come when this terrible catastrophe must make similar catastrophes impossible. \* \* \* All great Powers must get together in order to make an end to this unparalleled crime. \* \* \* The nations now at war will have to live together in this house which they are now destroying, and the more terrible the destruction the worse for all of us. \* \* \* If this war is not to be the last great war, it is nothing else than criminal madness."

If old Europe is struggling to get out of this Gehenna of militarism, what idiocy it is for Young America to be getting ready to plunge into it! If the failure of other nations to make this war the last great war will be criminal madness, what kind of madness is it for this nation to spend a billion of dollars in preparing to continue and perpetuate war?

It is within the power of this nation, at this juncture, to inflict upon the human race an unspeakable injury, and it looks as though she were bound to do it. God grant that I may not live to see it!

### SHOULDER ARMS!

(*Independent*, October, 1915.)

Henry A. Wise Wood is alarmed. As President of the American Society of Aeronautical Engineers he attended the other day one of the "war" luncheons, being held every week at the Technology Club of this city, and there made a few remarks. According to the papers, Mr. Wood is said to have said:

"Records in Washington show that a certain European nation could land in the United States within forty-eight days 750,000 men, with 250,000 horses and munitions sufficient for a three months' campaign, with half the transports available before the present war. \* \* \* Furthermore similar records show that a nation on the Pacific could land 350,000 troops on the Pacific Coast within sixty-one days with half its transports."

Tho it may show a culpable disregard for our national safety, we must defer for the present consideration of the "certain European nation." Whichever it may be, it has sufficient troubles of its own at this moment and we can assume it will not attack us during the next few weeks, certainly not before Congress meets and increases taxes three or four fold so as to relieve our "criminal unpreparedness."

But how about that "nation on the Pacific"? Can it possibly be Japan? If so, we should worry.

Just think how easy it would be for the little yellow men to seize the Pacific Coast, proceed up over the mountain passes of the Sierras and Rockies and thence overrun the corn belt of

the Middle West. Indeed, once in the Mississippi Valley, there would be no stopping them until the pie belt of New England and the fried chicken belt of "our beloved Southland" were completely occupied.

In the first place the astute Japanese statesmen, having reversed their historic policy of maintaining friendly relations with the United States, would have to consider how 60,000,000 people could invade territory occupied by 100,000,000 people, 5000 miles away. Having resolved that this was easy enough, they would then proceed to mobilize their present army of 250,000 and increase it sufficiently so that 350,000 troops could be spared to cross the seas. Of course, they would have to increase the army much more than 350,000 in order to have at home enough to protect the Empire in case the United States sailed around the back way and attacked them in the rear.

But before the Japanese armada could attack America, the United States Navy would have to be sunk, for as Napoleon proved long ago, no overseas invasion can take place as long as the enemies' fleet is afloat. But as no fleet can operate 4000 miles from its base at more than fifty per cent of its strength, if Admiral Vreeland of our navy is to be believed, Japan, whose navy is now much inferior to ours, could hardly concentrate a fleet a third the strength of the American on the Pacific Coast.

But we know the Japanese are wonderful fighters, so we will assume that they have sunk our entire fleet. Then all they would have to do would be to clear the seas of our submarines and mines. The fact that England, with the greatest navy in the world, has not yet dared attempt to land an expedition on the German or Belgian coast, or Germany upon the English coast, is no proof that the abler yellow-skinned men would not succeed.

It will now be perfectly safe for the armada to set sail and be at our shores in the sixty-one days specified. The fact that some of these days have been consumed in waiting for the American fleet to be destroyed need give no concern. We know there are some four fast liners that go from Yokohoma to San Francisco in three weeks. No doubt the 1000 slower, smaller transports that would be needed could be readily put in com-

mission and convoyed over without mishap within the "sixty-one days." All the armada would then have to do would be to disembark its troops, demolish the fortified coast defenses and take the several lines of trenches that had been thrown up from Lower California to Puget Sound.

We all know how easily the coast defenses can be taken—at the Dardanelles, for instance—and how easily trenches have been captured in the present war, as the men on the firing line universally attest. No doubt the Japanese would seize our entrenchments with but few casualties. And to make certainty doubly certain, they would unquestionably bring with them sufficient 42 centimeter guns and ammunition, so that they would not be caught napping as the Russians have been. Despite the poverty of Japan and the enormous taxes owing to the Russo-Japanese War, she would find no difficulty in sending over enough ammunition so as to use up a million dollars' worth a day, as is frequently done before a charge by the Germans.

Having then, with their considerably smaller navy, sunk our fleet, eluded our submarines and mines, and with their army taken our trenches and driven our regular army and militia back over the Rockies, the Japanese would not find it very difficult to dispose of our "contemptible little army" of 1,000,000 volunteers, that would have been drilling night and day in the meantime.

And thus, in the shake of a lamb's tail, the subjugation of the United States would be complete. Mr. Henry A. Wise Wood deserves the thanks of the republic for his warning. To arms, Americans, to arms!

### IS IT NECESSARY?

(From the *Independent*, October, 1915.)

The plans worked out by Secretary Garrison and Secretary Daniels for increasing the army and navy were given out at Washington last week. They are said to have the President's approval.

The Garrison plan calls for an increase of our regular army

from 93,000 to 140,000, and the establishment of a continental army of soldiers who will enlist for six years. During the first three years they will be required to serve two months each year. During the last three years they will be subject to call to the colors at any time.

Secretary Daniels proposes a naval program for five years. The first year there will be begun two dreadnoughts, two battle cruisers, twenty-five coast submarines, five sea-going submarines, twelve destroyers, etc., and there will be an increase of 8000 men in the navy and an addition of 2500 to the Naval Academy. The program will increase the army appropriations by \$75,000,000 a year and the navy appropriations about the same. The entire program for national defense will total \$400,000,000 for next year.

This raises two questions that the American people have got to face, and face squarely. How are they going to raise the money? What are they going to get for it?

First. The National Government is proposing a budget of a billion and a quarter dollars.

Excluding postal appropriations, which the Government ultimately gets back in charge for service, Congress must provide about \$900,000,000 next year. Over \$600,000,000 of this will be for army, navy, pensions and interest on the public debt, all war items. This is more than twice as much as was expended on the German army and navy the year before the war.

Thus the total expenditure for war will be more than two-thirds of all the disbursements of our Government. This means that the American people have got to go deep down in their pockets. And what for?

To be sure, methods of warfare have changed, but defense as a political philosophy or a practical precaution of statesmanship remains about the same as ever. Defense is only the last link in a long chain of reasoning. As has been said, "before defense comes attack, and before attack come all the motives for aggression, all the misunderstandings and racial prejudices, all the intrigue and secret diplomacy and military preparations."

The war has no doubt rendered a change in military methods necessary, and undoubtedly a strengthening of our forces. But



why should the American people go beyond this and overload themselves with taxation for defense, when Europe is bleeding to death and Asia is straining every nerve to keep on good terms with us, and when war is certain to be the most hated word in existence when peace is once declared.

The United States never was so safe from invasion as it is today. Even tho the proposed increase is not unbearable it will necessarily tend to promote a feeling which will involve year by year greater expenditures until finally we fall under the same burden as the European nations.

We are at the parting of the ways. Let us give this matter the most sober consideration before it is too late.

### ARE WE PREPARED?

(*Independent*, November 6, 1916.)

"We have not a moment to lose. We must get out of this condition of being fatted capons. If this country is worth anything it is worth saving."

Thus spake H. M. Byllesly a few days ago at a luncheon in Chicago, where \$30,000 was subscribed to start a National Organization to induce Congress to pass legislation making military training and military service universal among the youth of the land.

Apparently, then, we are in for a campaign to make every male citizen in the United States a soldier. What should be the attitude of sensible people on this question?

In the first place, universal service in time of peace is so revolutionary a departure for this country that it can only be urged as a dire and all-compelling military necessity. Is there any such necessity? Let us see. Congress has just authorized a defense budget of \$67,344,000, the greatest sum ever appropriated in time of peace by any nation on earth for military purposes. The naval program laid down will give us in three years 157 additional ships. Altho our navy was already third in rank among the nations of the world, our fleet is to be increased by ten battleships, six battle cruisers, ten scout cruisers, fifty torpedo boat destroyers, sixty-eight submarines, one

hospital ship, three fuel oil ships, two ammunition ships, two gunboats, two destroyer tenders, one fleet submarine tender, one transport and one repair ship. We are to have 87,000 sailors to man these ships. This means that our naval program, which cost \$150,000,000 in 1913, the year before the Great War, will this coming year cost us \$588,000,000.

The army program is not one whit less impressive. The infantry is to be increased from thirty-one to sixty-one regiments, the field artillery from six to fifteen, the cavalry from fifteen to twenty-five and the coast artillery from 170 companies to 363. The standing army is to be increased from 102,000 to 220,000. Every soldier is to enlist for seven years, three years of active service, four years of reserve service. In ten years there will be 2,000,000 men training every summer. The National Guard has been increased and become practically a part of the regular army. It is calculated it will comprise about 440,000 men. The army program which in 1913 cost only \$100,000,000 has expanded to \$267,000,000.

When it is remembered that the navy is our first line of defense and that, according to Admiral Vreeland, no navy today can operate at more than fifty per cent of its strength over 3,000 miles from its base of supplies, it would seem as tho we ought to be equal in fighting strength to any possible opponent in our own waters.

But, since Admiral Dewey has said that our navy is already as good as any on earth and General Miles has said that our army could drive any foreign foe into the sea that landed here before they could go back and get reinforcements and President Wilson has said, "this country is not threatened from any quarter," we may conclude that our present military forces are large enough at least to "hold the fort" until our great citizen volunteer army can be recruited, equipt, drilled and prepared for action.

The experience of England in the present war demonstrates that a volunteer citizen army recruited after the war has begun is as good as any possible conscript army, no matter how long and highly trained, if only a little time is given to get going. The army and navy of the United States as provided under the recent legislation would seem to be able to give the

American citizen that time whenever the country needs his services. Why take him out of civil life till then?

### MORAL PREPAREDNESS

(From *The Independent*, January 10, 1916.)

We have already discussed at length the President's preparedness program from the military and financial standpoint. Is there not an aspect of the problem, however, more fundamental than either?

Here we are in the midst of the direst calamity known to history. Europe is bleeding to death. Asia is straining every nerve to hold our friendship. We would seem to be safer from invasion than at any time during our history. We are not only safe, but we are prosperous. Our prosperity, however, is not the result of our own planning. It is coined out of Europe's agony. And yet at the very time when our hearts should open as never before to the piteous cries from across the water, when all our thoughts and all our substance should be freely given to binding up the broken wounds, when the hour calls for a supreme and glorious unselfishness, we are proposing to retire within our little world and proclaim as our national policy, "safety first."

Instead of considering how to embark on a course that would bring us the gratitude and love of every nation—such for instance as taxing ourselves to lend them a billion dollars to repair their losses after the war—we propose a plan that will inevitably make each one of them hate us a little more.

Some years ago we returned to China \$10,000,000, which was an overpayment on the Boxer indemnity. That was not a present to China, but only a refusal to keep what did not rightfully belong to us. Yet the return of that sum—half the cost of a modern dreadnought—has made the United States the most beloved nation on earth in the hearts of that great Asiatic people now so sincerely groping for light and liberty. Is there not a lesson here for a nation that would plan preparedness for peace?

Let us then make haste slowly in increasing our armaments.

By the time the war is over we shall most likely find the nations ready to organize the world for peace and some sort of disarmament. If that is the case, any great burden of taxation now imposed on the American people for armament purposes will be wasted.

If the nations, however, instead of making a durable peace, only declare a truce in order to continue the mad scramble for greater and ever greater armaments, then the United States, having lost neither in treasure nor in men, will be in a better position than any other nation to enter the inevitable and crushing race whose end is death to all but the most powerful.

### THE NATION'S PREPAREDNESS

By Hon. Claude Kitchin (House Leader)

(Part of statement given to Press of North Carolina, November 20, 1915.)

The heretofore large and growing expenditures for our Navy has aroused the people of the country into asking, "Where shall it end?" Secretary Daniels, in his report to the last session of Congress, December, 1914, said: "The naval appropriations in our own country have doubled in a dozen years and have gone up by leaps and bounds in other countries. If this mad rivalry in construction goes on the burden will become too heavy for any nation to bear." In his report of December, 1913, he says: "The growing cost of dreadnaughts, of powder and of everything that makes an efficient navy gives reason to pause. The heavy expense commands national and international consideration. Ten years ago our largest battleships cost \$5,288,000. The next dreadnaught will cost \$14,044,000." (The dreadnaughts hereafter to be authorized will cost from \$18,000,000 to \$20,000,000, and in an interview the Secretary says all ship materials and munitions of war have gone up over 30 per cent.) He asks, "When is this accelerating expenditure to be reduced? \* \* \* If it is not hastened by appeals

for the peaceful settlement of national differences, the day is not far distant when the growing burdens of taxation for excessive war and naval expenditures will call a halt."

Now, in the face of the deplorable truth recited by the Secretary; in the face of the fact that we have a Navy superior to that of Germany or any other nation, except that of Great Britain; in the face of the fact that our navy is growing larger, stronger and better equipped than ever before; in the face of the fact, as the President declared both in his message to Congress December last and in his recent Manhattan Club speech, "We are threatened from no quarter," the proposed "Preparedness" program at one bound—one year—increases our already immensely large naval appropriations more than our total increase for the last fourteen years; more than the increase by Germany the whole fifteen years preceding the European war, and more than the combined increase of all the nations in the world in any one year in their history (in times of peace).

The five-year programme increases our naval appropriation over forty times more than the increase by Germany in five years preceding the European war; and \$200,000,000 more than the combined increase of all the nations in the world for the five years preceding the European war; and over \$50,000,000 more than the combined increase of all the nations in the world for the whole period of ten years immediately preceding the European war!

Add to this the fact that prior to the beginning of the European war we were expending annually on our navy from \$20,000,000 to \$30,000,000 more than Germany or any other nation (except Great Britain) was expending on its navy.

For the ten years preceding the European war we had expended on our Navy over \$300,000,000 more than Germany or any other nation (except Great Britain) had expended on its navy! And yet the metropolitan press, the magazine writers, the "Patriotic Societies" and the jingoes and war traffickers would frighten the country into the belief that we have a little, puny, eggshell of a navy!

The five-year naval programme calls for an increase of \$500,000,000—\$100,000,000 increase a year—which, including the inevitable incidental expenses for expanding the whole naval

establishment in order to accommodate the programme, will reach \$600,000,000 or over by the time the five years expire! This is all *extra in addition* to the large appropriations we have been annually making.

The army four-year programme demands \$450,000,000 increase, over \$100,000,000 a year extra, being an increase of more than 100 per cent over our annual army appropriations! All extra appropriations, be it remembered. Extra taxes must be paid by the people, be it remembered!

Before leaving the subject of enormity of the proposed programme. I desire to make a further observation:

At the expiration of the five-year period for the programme this country will then be expending on its Navy and Army more than any nation in the world in times of peace ever expended on its army and navy; more than England, with her navalism, more than Russia or Germany, with their huge militarism. At the beginning of the European war Germany was expending for past wars and preparations for wars (on its army and navy) 55 per cent. of the total amount of revenues collected, Japan 45 per cent., Great Britain 37 per cent., France 35 per cent., the United States over 60 per cent. With the proposed military and naval programme enacted into law the United States will be expending over 70 per cent of its total revenues—that is, out of every \$100 collected from the people over \$70 will go into militarism and navalism, including pensions, leaving less than \$30 for all other functions of our government and for all other benefits of the people.

#### THE BIG, OVERREACHING OBJECTION TO THE PROGRAM

The huge burden, heretofore unheard of or undreamed of, which this fabulous increase of appropriations for the army and navy will place upon the taxpayers can and will have to be borne, in spite of their murmurs and protests, which will surely come in the future. This of itself to me is a cruel wrong, especially under the conditions and situation of our country and our navy, as I have above outlined.

But the big, overreaching objection to this stupendous programme is that this sudden, radical and revolutionary move for

big water preparation on our part is going to shock the civilized world, and whatever be the outcome of the present war, will alarm the world again into an armed camp. It will postpone for generations the day of universal peace for which all Christendom has been praying. It will deprive this government, through its President, of the greatest opportunity to serve mankind that ever came to nation or to man, in the final negotiation of peace terms among the belligerents, to lay the basis of perpetual international peace.

The militarists and war traffickers of every nation in the world will point to our conduct as an example and a cause why big war preparations and big armaments should be renewed on a larger scale than ever before, and its consummation will only be limited by the ability of the nations appealed to. If we take this step every nation will suspect—in fact, every nation will feel convinced, and no argument of our government can dissipate such conviction—that our country in this tremendous step has other designs than mere self-defense. Every nation will absolutely know that no such step or measure is necessary. The world will be convinced, in spite of our protestations that we are preparing, as the *Seven Seas Magazine*, the organ of the Navy League, advocated in its last issue (November) for *wars of conquest*. This organ of this so-called patriotic society in its same issue boldly broadcasts throughout our country the savage, barbarous sentiment which I quote: "There should be no doubt that even with all possible moral refinements it is the absolute right of a nation to live to its fullest intensity, to expand, to found colonies, to get richer and richer by any proper means, such as armed conquest. Such expansion as an aim is an inalienable right and in the case of the United States it is a particular duty." This organ of the Navy League, the organization, as I said before, which has, by organized effort, created the sentiment of our people for a big militarism and navalism, is but giving the people of this country and of the world an earnest of what we are to expect when this programme is enacted into law.

The world, even among the belligerents of the present war, is already looking with grave suspicion and alarm upon this colossal step. Since writing the above, in confirmation of it, the

morning papers bring to us the speech of Lord Roseberry, made at the London University on the night of November the 16th, from which I quote: "I know nothing more disheartening than the announcement recently made that the United States—the one great country left in the world free from the hideous, bloody burden of war—is about to embark upon the building of a huge armada. It means that the burden will continue upon the other nations, and be increased exactly in proportion to the fleet of the United States. I confess that it is a disheartening prospect that the United States, so remote from European conflict, should voluntarily in these days take up the burden, which, after this war, will be found to have broken, or almost broken our backs."

## THE WAR IN EUROPE AND ITS LESSONS FOR US

By William Jennings Bryan

Do not allow yourselves to be deceived or misled as to the real issue. The question is not whether this nation would defend itself if attacked. We have a potential power of defense such as no other nation has today—such as no other nation has ever had, and other nations know it. There is no danger that an attack would not be resisted, and we would not depend upon the jingoes. They would be too busy making army contracts and loaning money at high rates of interest to reach the front. If we ever have a war, we will depend, as in the past, upon those who work when the country needs workers and fight only when the country needs fighters.

The question, I repeat, is not whether we would be willing or able to defend ourselves if attacked. The real question is whether we shall adopt the European standard of honor and build our hope of safety upon preparation which cannot be made without substituting for the peaceful spirit of our people the spirit of the militarist and the swagger of the bully. The spirit that leads nations to put their faith in physical force is the spirit that leads people into war. It is the spirit that expresses itself in threats and revels in the ultimatum.

I ask you next to remember that it is an expensive thing to prepare for wars that ought never to come. It cost us \$15,000,000



to build the last battleship launched, and that was only one-tenth of the amount spent on the navy that year. You might think, from the manner in which the jingoes belittle our army and navy, that we are at present spending nothing on preparedness. But we are, as a matter of fact, spending now \$250,000,000 annually, *getting ready for war*. We are spending more than \$147,000,000 on the navy and over \$100,000,000 on the army; and how much are we spending on agriculture? The Department of Agriculture, which looks after the interests of the largest single group in this, the largest agricultural country in the world—the Department of Agriculture which plants experimental stations throughout our land and sends representatives throughout the world to gather information for the farmer's benefit—this Department receives an appropriation of \$23,000,000 a year. We are in other words, spending more than ten times as much getting ready for war as we are spending on the Department of Agriculture. And yet the jingoes are not satisfied. They say that we must now turn over a new leaf; that we must get ready in earnest.

If the jingoes insist that we are in danger of attack, let us propose that we get ready by building roads; it will greatly increase our defensive power if we are able to quickly mobilize our army and rapidly transport it to the point threatened. And there is an advantage about this kind of preparedness; if, after we have prepared ourselves, the war does not come, we shall be able to make good use of the preparation in the work of production. If, however, we divert the money from useful channels and spend it all on battleships and arms and ammunition, we shall have wasted our money if the war does not come; and if it does come, the chances are that before it comes changes in methods of warfare will very much reduce the value of the preparation in which we have invested.

But as some may be more interested in having the volume of loanable money increased than in having good roads I present another calculation. The total capital and surplus of all the banks of the United States—national, State and private—aggregate a little less than four billions of dollars; with five billions we could duplicate every bank, double the loanable bank capital and surplus of the nation and have a billion dollars left with which to celebrate prosperity.

The taxpayers of the country will not be willing to bear the burdens necessary for the proposed preparation unless they are convinced that some nation is about to attack us. The jingoes understand this and they are, therefore, bearing false witness against other nations. They tell us to beware of Japan on the west, and if that does not frighten us they pick out some nation in Europe and accuse it of having designs against us; and if that does not frighten us they say: "Beware of the fate of Belgium!" How any normal mind can think of Belgium and the United States at the same time passes understanding. Belgium has seven millions and a half of people, while we have a hundred millions. Would not an ordinary mind, working smoothly and without excitement, be able to see the difference between seven and a half and a hundred? And there is a still greater difference. Belgium is separated from the countries roundabout by an imaginary boundary line, while we have the Pacific Ocean on one side and the Atlantic Ocean on the other. If any one is able to see the difference between an imaginary line and an ocean, let him learn what difficulty the nations have had in moving armies across narrow channels and then he will understand the protection of the Atlantic Ocean.

The third reason which I ask you to consider is this. The preparedness which we are now asked to make is against nations which are not preparing to fight us. But suppose we get ready to fight them; will they not prepare against us? If they can scare us when they are not prepared, will we not scare them when we do prepare? And then will not their preparation compel us to prepare more, and will we not scare them again and they us again, and we them again, until bankruptcy overtakes us all? This is no new thing. The people who profit by furnishing preparedness have been playing the nations of Europe against each other for a generation. Every battleship that is built in one country is made the excuse for building more battleships in other countries. Let me illustrate the plan of the battleship builder. Suppose three farmers lived around a little lake and a battleship builder wanted to increase his business—how would he go about it? He would go to the first farmer and say: "You are helpless. If your two neighbors were to combine against you, they could overcome you; your lack of pre-

paredness is an invitation to them. Let me build you a battleship and anchor it here by your land. Then they will see that you are prepared, and they will be afraid of you and peace will be preserved." He would then go to the second farmer and say: "Do you see that battleship over there? Do you know what that is for? That is for you. Are you willing to invite attack by being defenseless? Let me build you two battleships and then he will see that you are prepared and will be afraid of you and peace will be preserved." He would then go to the third farmer and say: "Either one of your neighbors is more than a match for you alone; together they can annihilate you. Your only safety lies in the building of three battleships. Then when they see you are ready they will be afraid of you and the peace of the lake will be preserved." By this time he would be able to go back to the first man and say: "Your little battleship is out of date. It is a provocation instead of a protection. Unless you are willing to build more ships you had better sink that one. It shows that you want to fight and everybody knows you can not fight. You must have four battleships on the latest pattern in order to prevent war by being prepared for it." And so on and so on. This is what they have been doing in Europe. Is it possible that they can entice us into this mad rivalry?

Some nation must lift the world out of the black night of war into the light of that day when an enduring peace can be built on love and brotherhood, and I crave that honor for this nation. More glorious than any page of history that has yet been written will be the page that records our claim to the promise made to the peacemakers.

This is the day for which the ages have been waiting. For nineteen hundred years the gospel of the Prince of Peace has been making its majestic march around the world, and during these centuries the philosophy of the Sermon on the Mount has become more and more the rule of daily life. It only remains to lift that code of morals from the level of the individual and make it real in the law of nations, and ours is the nation best prepared to set the example. We are less hampered by precedent than other nations and therefore more free to act. I appreciate the value of precedent—what higher tribute can I

pay it than to say that it is as universal as the law of gravitation and as necessary to stability? And yet the law of gravitation controls only inanimate nature—everything that lives is in constant combat with the law of gravitation. The tiniest insect that creeps upon the ground wins a victory over it every time it moves; even the slender blade of grass sings a song of triumph over this universal law as it lifts itself up toward the sun. So every step in human progress breaks the law of precedent. Precedent lives in the past—it relies on memory, because a thing never was, precedent declares that it can never be. Progress walks by faith and dares to try the things that ought to be.

This, too, in the leading Christian nation. We give more money every year to carry the gospel to those who live under other flags than any other nation now living or that has lived. The two reasons combine to fix the eyes of the world upon us as the one nation which is at liberty to lead the way from the blood-stained methods of the past out into the larger and better day.

We must not disappoint the hopes which our ideals and achievements have excited. If I know the heart of the American people they are not willing that this supreme opportunity shall pass by unimproved. No, the metropolitan press is not the voice of the nation; you can no more measure the sentiment of the peace-loving masses by the froth of the jingo press than you can measure the ocean's depth by the foam upon its waves.